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“Nothing is more basic to the criminal process than the right of
the accused to a trial by an impartial jury. The presumption of
innocence, the prosecutor’s heavy burden of proving guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt, and the other protections afforded the accused
at trial are of little value unless those who are called to decide the
defendant’s guilt or innocence are free of bias.”1
“The use of peremptory challenges contributes to the historical
and ongoing underrepresentation of minority groups on juries,
imposes substantial administrative costs, results in less effective
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1. People v. Branch, 389 N.E.2d 467, 469 (N.Y. 1979).
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juries, and unfairly amplifies resource disparity among litigants—
all without substantiated benefits. The peremptory challenge is an
antiquated procedure that should no longer be used.”2
INTRODUCTION
The American jury has generated boundless dissertations about its
history, purpose, structure, and continuing vitality. The Louisiana Law
Review’s 2020 Symposium contributes significantly to this literature,
addressing historical perspectives on the jury, the jury as a political and
cultural institution, and standards in criminal and civil jury trials.3 I was
honored to participate on a panel exploring the topic of jury impartiality
in criminal cases.4
The American criminal jury is unique in the world by virtue of this
country’s commitment to lay jurors from the local community wielding
final authority over whether the state may exercise its power to punish. 5
The criminal law system’s expectation that these lay jurors will be
“impartial” reflects not only an interest in decision-making fairness and
accuracy, but also the fact that jurors decide cases in an adversarial system
of dispute resolution. In criminal trials in particular, defense lawyers and
prosecutors know that their zealous advocacy to the lay jury is what stands
between the defendant and the state’s desire to punish. Thus, the jurors
2. State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 348 (Wash. 2013) (González, J.,
concurring).
3. See Symposium Objective and Purpose, LSU LAW, https://www.law.
lsu.edu/symposium/ [https://perma.cc/6D4T-2QGH] (last visited May 1, 2020).
4. See Schedule, LSU LAW, https://www.law.lsu.edu/symposium/schedule/
[https://perma.cc/5RW3-AUFK] (last visited May 1, 2020).
5. See generally Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (recognizing
an “essential feature” in the lay jury of interposing the “commonsense judgment
of a group of laymen” between the defendant and prosecution, and the
“community participation and shared responsibility which results from that
group’s determination of guilt or innocence”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
156 (1968) (affirming that the jury trial right “reflect[s] a fundamental decision
about the exercise of official power—a reluctance to entrust plenary power over
the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or a group of judges”). The
uniqueness of this lay-jury system extends to specific doctrine, such as largely
unimpeachable general verdicts and jury nullification. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID.
606(b); Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 865 (2017) (noting that
“[s]ome version of the no-impeachment rule is followed in every State and the
District of Columbia”); State v. Ragland, 519 A.2d 1361, 1372 (N.J. 1986)
(observing that “[j]ury nullification is an unfortunate but unavoidable power” of
the jury).
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must be ready to receive the lawyers’ partisan advocacy from arm’s length,
with an open mind.6 This combination—partisan legal advocacy directed
to an impartial audience of lay jurors—forms the heart of the American
criminal jury trial. Indeed, for experienced trial lawyers, once the
metaphorical pugilist bell rings to start a jury trial, the mindset narrows to
“game on,”7 with near tunnel vision on the jurors who will decide the
outcome.8
Several features of the federal and state constitutions, statutes, and
court rules contribute to juror “impartiality.”9 The focus of this Article,
however, is on the intersection of anti-bias norms and zealous advocacy in
the selection of “impartial” jurors.10 This intersection reveals a recurring
and so far intractable11 dichotomy of bias in jury selection. On the one
6. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
7. Brooks Holland, Anticipatory Self-Defense Claims as a Lens for
Reexamining Zealous Advocacy and Anti-Bias Disciplinary Norms, 49 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 89, 117 (2016).
8. This narrowing of professional focus with the commencement of jury trial
is implicitly reinforced by several Rules of Professional Conduct. See MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶¶ 2, 8, 9; r. 1.1–.3, 3.1–.7 (AM. BAR ASS’N
1980).
9. The law has not achieved a comprehensive understanding of impartiality
in practice. See Richard Loren Jolly, The New Impartial Jury Mandate, 117 MICH.
L. REV. 713, 724 (2019) (commenting that “[c]ourts have struggled to advance a
cohesive definition of impartiality that can reflect the jury’s competing
responsibilities”). The jury system, however, seeks juror impartiality early in the
jury selection process with the fair cross-section requirement. See Lockhart v.
McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 187 (1986) (connecting fair cross-section requirement to
jury impartiality); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975). How a trial
court instructs prospective and sitting jurors also can affect impartiality. See, e.g.,
Unconscious Bias Juror Video, U.S. DIST. CT. W. DIST. WASH., https://www
.wawd.uscourts.gov/jury/unconscious-bias [https://perma.cc/DY2N-QVQ5] (last
visited June 1, 2020); Criminal Jury Instruction—Unconscious Bias, U.S. DIST.
CT. W. DIST. WASH., https://www.wawd.uscourts.gov/sites/wawd /files/Criminal
JuryInstructions-ImplicitBias.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GKP-4RNF] (last visited
June 1, 2020). The law increasingly has been willing to enforce impartiality postverdict to expose racial bias in the deliberation room. See Peña-Rodriguez v.
Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871 (2017); State v. Behre, 44 P.3d 1172 (Wash. 2019);
see also Jolly, supra, at 740–50. For modernistic takes on jury impartiality, see
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Big Data Jury, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 935
(2016); Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579 (2011).
10. For an examination of this intersection of zealous advocacy and anti-bias
norms in other contexts, see Holland, supra note 7.
11. Cf. Anna Roberts, (Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of
Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 829 (2012) (referring to the
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hand, the U.S. legal system demands an impartial jury as critical to a fair
trial.12 Juror bias against a party or claim undermines this fundamental
principle, and no one can discern case-specific biases better than the
lawyers who have investigated and strategized the parties’ theories of the
case and who are tasked with proving and arguing that theory directly to
the jury.13 This jury trial system therefore entrusts the partisan lawyers in
jury selection to contribute their dedicated mindset to the process of
identifying and removing jurors who may harbor these biases. Working
from voir dire, lawyers thus zealously seek and remove juror bias by
exercising challenges for cause, plus a specified number of peremptory
challenges.14
On the other hand, experience demonstrates that these same lawyers
will deploy their own biases in examining and excluding jurors. Indeed,
the phenomenon of lawyer bias in jury selection is not a bug but rather a
feature of the system, because the jury selection process is all about bias—
bias against jurors who may harbor prejudices against a party or claim, and
bias in favor of jurors who may be receptive to that party or claim. But
sometimes lawyer bias manifests as racial bias, sex or gender bias, or other
invidious biases that violate the rights of jurors to serve their community
free from discrimination. History is replete with the discriminatory
exclusion of jurors based on race or sex,15 and the peremptory challenge

“intractable . . . challenge of creating a fair process for the selection of fair
jurors”).
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing right in any criminal
prosecution to “trial, by an impartial jury”); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648,
668 (1987) (observing that “the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very
integrity of the legal system”); People v. Branch, 389 N.E.2d 467, 469 (N.Y.
1979) (opining that “[n]othing is more basic to the criminal process than the right
of the accused to a trial by an impartial jury”); cf. McDonough Power Equip., Inc.
v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984) (recognizing jury impartiality in civil cases).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part II.
15. See Paul Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 911, 918–21 (1997) (observing “our county’s sad history of
excluding black people from juries”); cf. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390,
1418–19 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (describing the non-unanimous jury
verdict rule as “‘the last of Louisiana’s Jim Crow laws’”); id. at 1411 (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (noting “legacy” of racial discrimination in Louisiana and Oregon
jury systems, and that “the States’ legislatures never truly grappled with the laws’
sordid history”); Peña-Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855, 867 (2017)
(detailing history of racial discrimination in jury system).

2020]

CONFRONTING THE BIAS DICHOTOMY

169

has become the primary vehicle for this practice.16 Modern jury selection
practices may only be making this dynamic worse. As trial courts
increasingly economize voir dire, which is the main source for transparent,
evidence-based challenges to jurors, lawyers must turn more and more to
opaque peremptory challenges and intuition to identify and strike biased
jurors. The U.S. Supreme Court established a regime for regulating
discriminatory peremptory challenges in Batson v. Kentucky,17 but Batson
has not succeeded in effectively regulating discriminatory peremptory
challenges, leading some courts and commentators to call for eliminating
peremptory challenges.18
A bias dichotomy results: zealous lawyers are an important safeguard
against juror bias in criminal trials, yet our concern over lawyer bias may
lead us to eliminate one of the legal safeguards against juror bias—the
peremptory challenge. Both sides of this bias dichotomy implicate critical
concerns for a just jury trial system, yet the status quo has become
inadequate.
This Article will argue that this bias dichotomy may be resolved
without resorting to zero-sum choices, such as the elimination of
peremptory challenges. In particular, a novel experiment taking place in
the State of Washington to reform the Batson test merits attention and
16. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 103–05 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (reviewing discriminatory history of the peremptory challenge);
Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1593, 1620
(2018) (reviewing history of racial discrimination in jury selection and noting shift
to use of peremptory challenge as a principal tool after about 1935).
17. Batson, 476 U.S. 79.
18. See, e.g., State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467, 481 (Wash. 2018) (Yu, J.,
concurring) (observing that “I . . . remain convinced that nothing short of
complete abolishment of the peremptory challenge . . . will get us on the right path
toward finally eradicating racial bias in jury selection”); State v. Erickson, 398
P.3d 1124, 1134 (Wash. 2017) (Yu, J., concurring) (calling “for the complete
abolishment of peremptory challenges”); State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 348
(Wash. 2013) (González, J., concurring) (concluding that “it is time to abolish
peremptory challenges”); see also State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 340 (Iowa
2019) (Cady, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he solution in the future is to do away with
the peremptory challenge.”); id. (Wiggins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“The only way to stop the misuse of peremptory challenges is to abolish
them.”); People v. Brown, 769 N.E.2d 1266, 1273 (N.Y. 2002) (Kaye, C.J.,
concurring) (“My nearly 16-year experience with Batson persuades me that, if
peremptories are not entirely eliminated (as some have urged), they should be
very significantly reduced.”); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten
Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1182–83 (1995) (arguing that
“[p]eremptory challenges should be eliminated”).
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further study as a vehicle for confronting, and hopefully mitigating, the
bias dichotomy in jury selection. Developed as a court rule, Washington
Supreme Court General Rule 37 (GR 37)19 materially alters the standards
and procedures of the Batson rule to give judicial review of peremptory
challenges the teeth it needs to minimize the vices of those challenges
without altogether denying their virtues to litigants, especially criminal
defendants. This Article will position GR 37 as a potential model for
confronting the bias dichotomy in jurisdictions that are unsatisfied with
the status quo in jury selection, yet seek to reform rather than to eliminate
the peremptory challenge as an important feature of that process.
Part I of this Article will present the bias dichotomy in jury selection,
pitting lawyer bias against juror bias. In defining this bias dichotomy, this
section will explore three critical features to the selection of an impartial
jury: (1) zealous advocacy from lawyers; (2) challenges for cause; and (3)
peremptory challenges. Part II will explore the failings of the Batson
regime in regulating the lawyer-bias side of this dichotomy, resulting in
calls to eliminate the peremptory challenge, such as those in recent
opinions by some justices of the Washington Supreme Court that have
garnered national attention.20 Responding to these calls to eliminate the
peremptory challenge, Part III will defend these challenges as necessary
to address the competing concern for juror bias and to realize other values
of the jury trial system. This argument will not seek to diminish the valid
concerns about peremptory challenges. Rather, the argument will reinforce
the virtues of the peremptory challenge as a reason to continue to seek nonbinary solutions to the bias dichotomy. Examining one such potential
solution, Part IV will review Washington’s GR 37 as an effort to rebalance these interests, so that lawyers can confront rather than succumb
to the bias dichotomy in jury selection. The Article will close with some
forward-looking observations about GR 37.
In addressing this bias dichotomy thesis, this Article will implicitly
accept certain premises that permeate the paper and thus should be
acknowledged. First, this paper often will examine the bias dichotomy
through the lens of criminal defense values, with the assumption that these
perspectives will track symmetrically for prosecutors and civil lawyers, as
they typically do under the Batson regime.21 The bias dichotomy, however,
19. GR 37 is available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/pdf/GR/
GA_GR_37_00_00.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QMP-TKC2].
20. See infra notes 84–138.
21. See Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (holding that racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause); Georgia v. McCullom, 505 U.S.
42 (1992) (applying Batson rule to peremptory challenges by the defense);
Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (applying Batson rule
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may scale quite differently for civil litigants and especially for prosecutors.
Prosecutors and some civil litigants may not face the same concerns over
juror bias as criminal defendants, nor might society have the same interests
in regulating bias by lawyers against criminal defendants.22 In particular,
the State and its prosecutorial agents have a unique responsibility to
represent the entire community.23 Yet, the State and its agents also own a
unique legacy of deploying the peremptory challenge discriminatorily as
part of a racist criminal law system.24
Thus, if this paper’s reflections and prescriptions for criminal
defendants do not seem as good of a fit for civil litigators or prosecutors,
the ideal arrangement might be to adopt asymmetrical rules for peremptory
challenges between prosecutors, criminal defendants, and civil litigants.25
to peremptory challenges by civil litigants); cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall,
J., concurring) (arguing against disparate peremptory challenge rights between
prosecution and defense, because “[o]ur criminal justice system ‘requires not only
freedom from any bias against the accused, but also from any prejudice against
his prosecution’”).
22. See Holland, supra note 7, at 104–09. For the view that discriminatory
peremptory challenges by the defense cause at least two of the three principal
harms that arise from discriminatory peremptory challenges by prosecutors, see
Audrey M. Fried, Protecting Jurors from the Use of Race-Based Peremptory
Challenges by Defense Counsel, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1320–22 (1997)
(identifying harm to jurors and to the integrity of the criminal justice system).
23. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N
1980) (noting that “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice
and not simply that of an advocate”); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935) (famously holding “[t]he United States Attorney is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern
at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done”); State v. Walker, 341 P.3d 976, 984
(Wash. 2015) (noting that a prosecutor’s “advocacy has its limits,” and thus a
prosecutor has the duty to ‘subdue courtroom zeal,’ not to add to it, in order to
ensure that the defendant receives a fair trial”).
24. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 103–05 (Marshall, J., concurring); Frampton,
supra note 16, at 1600–20. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2012).
25. Some jury selection rules do implicitly recognize asymmetrical interests
in jury impartiality by apportioning fewer peremptory challenges to the
prosecution. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2) (providing that in felony cases,
the prosecution will have six peremptory challenges but the defense ten); see also
David B. Rottman & Shauna M. Strickland, State Court Organization 2004, U.S.
DEP’T JUST. (2004), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco04.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8XZZ-APB7] (reporting that 42 states, the District of Columbia, and
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If, however, the law continues to track symmetrically in this area between
these three groups, then the law should be calibrated to the criminal
defendant, whose unique, individual constitutional interests in both juror
impartiality and zealous advocacy bring the bias dichotomy to its apex.
Reforms should not resolve this bias dichotomy through uniform solutions
that may fit the interests and responsibilities of the prosecutor or even the
civil litigant unless they also fit the criminal defendant’s distinct interests
and responsibilities.
Second, this Article will work from the premise that the lay jury
system in the United States remains a desirable practice that we should
maintain.26 Of course, many other legal systems boast effective criminal
adjudication that does not rely entirely on lay jurors, or on lay jurors at
all.27 Moreover, the criminal law system in the United States is in truth a
world of plea bargaining more than a world of jury trials.28 As a result,
Puerto Rico afford equal number of peremptory challenges to the defense and
prosecution, and eight states provides the defense with more). Civil parties
typically have fewer peremptory challenges than parties to a criminal case. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2018) (providing only three peremptory challenges to each
party in a civil case). One scholar has argued that symmetrical peremptory
challenges between the prosecution and defense violates the Constitution. See
Brittany L. Deitch, The Unconstitutionality of Criminal Jury Selection, 26 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1059 (2018).
26. Of course, historically, the lay jury in the United States has not been a
static legal creature, but essential features have remained constant. See Josh
Bowers, Democratization and the Restoration of Moral Judgment: Upside-Down
Juries, 11 NW. U. L. REV. 1655, 1663 (2017) (noting that “even though jury
practice has evolved significantly since the Founding, our aspirations for the
institution have remained largely unchanged”).
27. See, e.g., Ingram Weber, The New Japanese Jury System: Empowering
the Public, Preserving Continental Justice, 4 E. ASIA L. REV. 125, 126 (2009)
(reporting that “[b]eginning in 2009, Japan will introduce juries into criminal
trials,” in which “[m]ixed panels of lay assessors and professional judges will hear
serious criminal cases and jointly determine guilt and sentences”); Renée Lettow
Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for an American
Murder in the French Cour D’Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 800–01 (2001)
(reviewing French Court d’assises mixed-jury system for serious crimes, and
Tribunal correctional non-jury system for less serious crimes); Elisabetta Grande,
Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 228
(2000) (noting that in the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, criminal cases are
adjudicated by a “single body of adjudicators—consisting of professional judges,
that in the most serious cases sit together with lay assessors”).
28. “According to data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
trials accounted for 3.1% of federal convictions in 2008, 2.5% in 2012, and 2.4%
in 2016. . . . [A]ccording to data from the National Center for State Courts, in
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many criminal cases are not subject to the serious adversarial testing that
this paper will champion, especially in misdemeanor cases.29 Several
commentators have proposed other mechanisms for criminal adjudication
or other entry points for community participation in decision-making in
criminal cases that could be more robust in the end than a jury trial
exemplar that is rarely realized.30 Even global events like the COVID-19
pandemic may demand consideration of new paradigms for adjudicating
criminal cases.31

2015 the felony trial rates for California, New York, and Texas were 2.3%, 4.0%,
and 2.1%. Trials are even rarer in misdemeanor cases.” Williams Ortman, SecondBest Criminal Justice, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1061, 1067, 1070 (2019); cf. Ronald
F. Wright, Kami Chavis & Gregory Parks, The Jury Sunshine Project: Jury
Selection as a Political Issue, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1407, 1421 (2018) (reporting
that in a study of 100 North Carolina counties “[r]emarkably, the clerks in 10 of
the 100 counties reported that no jury trials at all occurred in their counties
between 2011 and 2013”).
29. Cf. Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2nd 1122, 1124–26
(W.D. Wash. 2013) (finding that “meet and plead” system for public defense
representation in two Washington State cities systematically deprived defendants
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, because “[a]dversarial testing of the
government’s case was so infrequent that it was virtually a non-factor in the
functioning of the Cities’ criminal justice system”); Gerard Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2118
(1998) (arguing that American plea bargaining “as it actually operates in most
cases looks much more like what common lawyers would describe as a nonadversarial, administrative system of justice than the adversarial model they
idealize”).
30. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 26, at 1659 (arguing that “we should move
juries from the trial stage to the stages of arrest, bail, charge, bargain, and
sentence”); Laura Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 IND. L.J. 731, 734 (2010)
(expressing a goal “to restore the community-jury right to the bulk of criminal
adjudication by envisioning the community’s integration into the guilty plea”).
31. See, e.g., Matt Reynolds, Could Zoom jury trials become the norm during
the coronavirus pandemic?, ABA J. (May 11, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.aba
journal.com/web/article/could-zoom-jury-trials-become-a-reality-during-the-pan
demic [https://perma.cc/7WSN-WWEG] (exploring whether traditional jury trial
practices can be replicated on the Zoom platform); Debra Cassens Weiss,
Potential jurors questioned via zoom for summary jury trial in Texas, ABA J.
(May 19, 2020, 10:25 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/potentialjurors-questioned-via-zoom-for-summary-jury-trial-in-texas [https://perma.cc/96
D9-P9YQ] (reporting on first potential Zoom civil jury trial, including use of
Zoom breakout rooms for the traditional practice of lawyers approaching the
bench for a sidebar). Some courts in other countries are using Zoom for a wide
range of criminal proceedings. See, e.g., John Geddie, Man sentenced to death in
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For better or worse, the jury trial remains the quintessence of
American criminal justice, and my experience with jury trials confirms
their unique value, as well as their inefficiency, relative to other systems.32
This Article does not seek to refute important discourse about new and
more efficacious paradigms for criminal adjudication. Instead, this paper
accepts the premise that the jury trial is the paradigm that the criminal
justice system has adopted. The jury trial system therefore must confront
the bias dichotomy that this paradigm presents.
I. THE BIAS DICHOTOMY
The bias dichotomy arises with the jury selection process. Mileage
varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and even from judge to
judge, on the precise features of the jury selection process. One federal
judge, however, has effectively captured the essential components of this
process in just about every courthouse:
Ordinarily, in civil and criminal cases in both state and federal
courts, the panel of jurors that decides the case is selected from a
much larger pool. Voir dire is the process of questioning
prospective jurors about their qualifications to serve on the jury
panel to decide the case. The rules of almost all courts, state and
federal, provide that the questioning of prospective jurors may be
conducted by the judge, the attorneys for the parties, or both. In
the course of the questioning, both parties and the court may strike
potential jurors for cause when the prospective juror’s views
would “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and oath.” At
the conclusion of voir dire the parties are also ordinarily
authorized to make a certain number of “peremptory challenges”
to strike jurors without stating a reason for doing so.33

Singapore on Zoom call, REUTERS (May 19, 2020, 11:51 PM), https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-singapore-crime-idUSKBN22W0I6 [https://per ma.cc/XTN
7-YNXS] (reporting on judicial use of Zoom video platform to impose death
sentences in Singapore and Nigeria).
32. Cf. Rocha v. King Co., 460 P.3d 624 (Wash. 2020) (González, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that “[t]he benefits of jury service to the court, to the
community, and to the jurors themselves, would be hard to overstate”).
33. Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in
Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise
of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 158–59 (2010)
(internal footnotes omitted); see also Tania Tetlow, Why Batson Misses the Point,

2020]

CONFRONTING THE BIAS DICHOTOMY

175

The jury selection process “is a critical part of trial and ought not to
be treated as merely a prelude to the main event,”34 because this process
ensures an impartial jury, which is essential to a fair trial.35 “Yet, despite
the concept’s centrality, there is little agreement on what makes a jury
impartial,”36 and “[c]ourts have struggled to advance a cohesive definition
of impartiality that can reflect the jury’s competing responsibilities.”37 As
a general matter, the best the law can do is declare that a prospective juror
lacks impartiality if the juror’s views would “prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath.”38
Notably, this standard of impartiality does not present a pure question
of law for judges to decide. Rather, this question of juror competency is
highly fact specific to the individual juror,39 drawing on the many norms
and values of the U.S. lay jury system, such as accuracy, legitimacy,
fairness, and inclusiveness, all empowering a voice of community justice
97 IOWA L. REV. 1713, 1715–16 (2012) (summarizing jury selection process); see,
e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24; FED. R. CIV. P. 47; WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 6.4
(2020); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.05–.55 (LexisNexis 2020).
34. In re Pers. Restraint of Meredith, 422 P.3d 458, 467 (Wash. 2018) (Yu.,
J., concurring).
35. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (observing that “the
impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system”);
People v. Branch, 389 N.E.2d 467, 469 (N.Y. 1979) (“Nothing is more basic to
the criminal process than the right of the accused to a trial by an impartial jury.”);
cf. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981); Ristaino v. Ross,
424 U.S. 589, 594–95 (1976) (identifying relationship between voir dire and the
State’s constitutional “obligation to the defendant to impanel an impartial jury”).
36. Jolly, supra note 9, at 714.
37. Id. at 724.
38. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (quoting Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980)); see, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(b)
(permitting challenge for cause if the prospective juror “has a state of mind that is
likely to preclude him from rendering an impartial verdict based upon the
evidence adduced at the trial”). Jurisdictions also provide for various statutory
disqualifications for jurors who, for example, are related to a party or lack other
qualifications, such as residency in the jurisdiction. See, e.g., id. § 270.20(1)(a),
270.20(1)(c). An interesting, recent case in Colorado nevertheless upheld a
defendant’s conviction even though the trial judge’s own spouse served on the
jury and the judge made numerous comments about their relationship during the
trial. See Richardson v. People, No. 18SC686, 2020 WL 2829847 (Colo. June 1,
2020).
39. See United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1226 (1986) (quoting
Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (noting that “[j]ury competence is
an individual rather than a group or class matter”)).
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that operates independently of the state, including the judiciary.40
Impartiality cannot be simplified into a convenient formula that limits the
jury’s ability to dispense independent community justice.
This jury system, therefore, does not entrust judges alone to determine
jury impartiality as an objective legal equation reserved to judicial
expertise. Rather, the system submits this legal question to the rigors of
adversarial testing by the parties, a process that positions judges to impanel
a jury whose impartiality that process has validated.41 The adversarial
40. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (observing that “[j]ury
service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the rights of the
parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all of the people”);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (recognizing that “the essential
feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his
accuser of the commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the
community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group’s
determination of guilt or innocence”); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
(reviewing values underlying jury trial right); cf. Rocha v. King Co., 460 P.3d 624
(Wash. 2020) (González, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “[t]he benefits of jury
service to the court, to the community, and to the jurors themselves, would be
hard to overstate,” and drawing specific values from Tocqueville’s Democracy in
America); cf. Wright, Chavis & Parks, supra note 28, at 1431–32 (“Jury service
creates a forum for popular participation in criminal justice.”); Paul Butler,
Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System,
105 YALE L.J. 677, 709–12 (1995) (arguing role of jury to counter “democratic
domination” by racial and political majorities against minority communities);
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, 52 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 205, 205 (1989) (noting potential superiority of deliberative jury to single
judge because of the jury’s “ability to reflect the perspectives, experiences, and
values of the ordinary people in the community—not just the common or typical
perspective, but the whole range of viewpoints”); cf. Frampton, supra note 16, at
1620–21 (identifying various rationales for the jury system and importance of
inclusion). This notion of the independent jury might be quite foreign to, and
incongruous with, an inquisitorial legal system. See Lerner, supra note 27, at 814–
17 (observing that in the French mixed-jury system, “[p]rofessional judges and
lay jurors are treated more as colleagues and collaborators than as independent
forces”).
41. Some observers would argue that this process does little to validate juror
impartiality, and rather “often demean[s] jurors in actual practice.” Lerner, supra
note 27, at 816; see also id. at 814, 816 (observing that jurors in France “are
treated with respect. The parties are not allowed to pick them over with a finetooth comb; voir dire is brief and remarkably unintrusive,” and jurors thus are
treated “as if they were responsible human beings with serious duties”). True that
the United States jury system does often impose more bureaucratic inefficiencies
on jurors as a group, and the voir dire process itself can be more intrusive to
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process is rarely perfect in this validation, but the adversarial jury system
relies on this same process in other analogous contexts to validate answers
to partly normative legal questions. For example, in rejecting the
constitutionality of judges admitting testimonial hearsay without crossexamination of the declarant on grounds that the testimony satisfies a legal
test for reliability, the Supreme Court declared:
Admitting statements deemed to be reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right to confrontation. To be sure,
the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure the reliability of evidence,
but it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination. . . . Dispensing with confrontation because testimony
is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a
defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth
Amendment prescribes.42
For jury selection, one easily could substitute the term “impartial juror” in
this adversarial constitutional equation for any of the Court’s references to
reliable witnesses.
A jury trial is where a lawyer’s zealous advocacy naturally reaches its
adversarial zenith. The jury trial system does not tolerate this behavior
from lawyers simply because of the stakes and rigors of the jury trial. On
the contrary, one expects zealous advocacy from the parties to ensure that
the jury trial system functions according to adversarial norms:
As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under
the rules of the adversary system. . . . A lawyer’s responsibilities
as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a
public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing
party is well represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on
individual jurors. I am, however, not so certain that those experiences are
necessarily disrespectful or demeaning to jurors. On the contrary, having tried
dozens of criminal cases myself, my experience is that this process can reinforce,
albeit laboriously sometimes, that each individual juror is unique and central to
this important task. I rarely have observed jurors once selected not approach their
task with individual seriousness and integrity, perhaps a product of the message
conveyed by robust and individualized jury selection practices.
42. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004); see also id. at 62
(quoting M. HALE, HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND
258 (1713)) (“[A]dversarial testing ‘beats and bolts out the Truth much better.’”)
(emphasis added).
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behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being
done.43
Zealous advocacy holds a special currency for criminal defense
lawyers once a jury trial commences. Numerous commentators have
observed that “the case for undiluted partisanship is most compelling” in
criminal defense.44 This case for partisan advocacy has virtuous roots, as
the duty of zealous advocacy has been associated with “autonomy,
individual rights, a need to curb excesses by the state, client satisfaction,
and the achievement of a substantively just result.”45 The Rules of
Professional Conduct themselves recognize the unique advocacy role of
defense counsel in the adjudication of a criminal case, exempting defense
counsel from the general prohibition on frivolous claims and defenses. A
criminal defense lawyer may “defend the proceeding as to require that
every element of the case be established.”46 For these reasons, the law has
embraced the following model of criminal defense advocacy, despite
understandable critique:
[D]efense counsel has no . . . obligation to ascertain or present the
truth. Our system assigns him a different mission. He must be and
43. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶¶ 2, 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N
1980); see also id. at Preamble ¶ 9 (including “the lawyer’s obligation zealously
to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate interests” as a basic principle underlying
the Model Rules). Not all jurisdictions are enamored of the term “zealous
advocacy.” See, e.g., WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶¶ 2, 7, 8; r.
3.1 cmt. 1 (2006) (substituting “conscientious and ardent” advocacy for references
to “zealous” advocacy).
44. Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 589, 605 (1985); see also Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous
Representation—Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical
Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771, 775 (2006) (defending a robust model of
client-centered advocacy when a lawyer represents a client in a criminal matter,
because “the criminal defense lawyer is the client’s lone champion against a
hostile world”).
45. Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1169
(2006); see also Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham and Zeal, 34
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1319 (2006) (exploring the history of, and defending, the ethical
norm of zealous advocacy). But cf. Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green,
Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 66–67 (2005)
(exploring another potential dichotomy, between traditional zealous advocacy and
advocacy with “emphasis on personal conscience and discretion,” and instead
suggesting “a third conception of advocacy ethics,” drawing on notions of
“professional conscience”).
46. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2002).
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is interested in preventing the conviction of the innocent, but,
absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that he defend his
client whether he is innocent or guilty. . . . Defense counsel need
present nothing, even if he knows what the truth is. . . . Our
interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the
State to its proof, to put the State’s case in the worst possible light,
regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the truth. . . . In this
respect . . . we countenance or require conduct which in many
instances has little, if any, relation to the search for truth.47
This duty of zealous advocacy certainly extends to jury selection.48
Impartiality is the goal for jurors, but not for the lawyers themselves, and
most certainly not for criminal defense counsel. On the contrary, defense
attorneys must approach jury selection with their knowledge of the client
centrally in mind, while also anticipating the theory of the case, the
witnesses and evidence, and the multitude of biases against the client that
prospective jurors may bring with them into the courtroom. As a scholar
of criminal defense advocacy observed, “It is hard enough for a criminal
defendant standing trial; there are enough wrongful assumptions,
prejudices, and hostilities directed toward the criminally accused. When
one factors in that most criminal defendants are poor and
disproportionately nonwhite, the situation is that much worse.”49
For the lawyer, therefore, none of this jury-selection exercise is neutral
or objective. A lawyer may approach jury selection with the goal of
47. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256–58 (1967) (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal footnotes omitted). Of course,
in Wade, Justice White, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, embraced this
partisan model of criminal defense advocacy as a reason why defense counsel
should have no right to participate in an investigative lineup, even post-charge.
See id. at 258–59.
48. See Abbe Smith, “Nice Work if You Can Get It”: “Ethical” Jury
Selection in Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 533, 565 (1998)
(arguing that “[i]f a message can be gleaned from most of the scholarship and
commentary on criminal defense, it is that jury selection is critical to the outcome
of a criminal trial and, in this, as in all things, the client comes first and everything
and everyone else be damned”) (internal footnotes omitted).
49. Id. at 565; cf. Christian B. Sundquist, Uncovering Juror Racial Bias, 96
DENV. L. REV. 309, 314 (2019) (summarizing data about racial bias in the criminal
law system, including that “African-American men receive federal prison
sentences nearly 20% longer than white men for similar convictions,” AfricanAmericans comprise 38% of the prison population “despite constituting only 13%
of the overall population,” and the United States “‘imprisons a larger percentage
of its black population than South Africa did at the height of apartheid’”).
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producing an impartial jury by seeking individual jurors who lack or can
address their own explicit or implicit biases, who can relate to the client as
a member of a shared community, who will be open-minded to the client’s
factual and legal claims, and who bring appropriate skepticism to the
State’s claim and hold it to the burden of proof.50 To the partisan lawyer’s
mind, everyone else can take a hike. Moreover, the lawyer knows that a
more diverse jury may deliberate more meaningfully and accurately51 and
can better fulfill its role as an independent community check on
governmental power.52 Finally, the lawyer in a criminal case knows that
the requirement of a unanimous verdict raises the stakes that even one
rogue juror can defeat a verdict that the party otherwise might secure—
guilty or not guilty.53 These client-centric biases of the lawyer in selecting
a jury are not only unavoidable in, but central to, the adversarial system.54
This biased perspective of lawyers of course does not determine who
sits on the jury. Rather, this biased view of the parties provides the judge
with critical, case-specific insight for setting the scope of necessary voir
dire and for evaluating challenges for cause.55 The lawyers’ advocacy thus

50. Cf. Smith, supra note 48, at 565.
51. Cf. Sarah E. Gaither et al., Mere Membership in Racially Diverse Groups
Reduces Conformity, 9 SOC. PSYCH. & PERS. SCI. 402, 403 (2017) (observing that
diversity on a jury can counteract bias by white jurors by heightening their sense
of membership in a diverse group); Samuel R. Sommers, On Racial Diversity and
Group Decision Making: Identifying Multiple Effects of Racial Composition on
Jury Deliberations, 90 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 597 (2006) (seminal study
finding that diverse juries examined more facts of the case, evaluated the evidence
more deeply, deliberated longer, made fewer erroneous statements, and overall
performed better than homogeneous control juries); cf. State v. Saintcalle, 309
P.3d 326, 337 (Wash. 2013) (reviewing studies and concluding that “[t]hese
studies confirm what seems obvious from reflection: more diverse juries result in
fairer trials”).
52. Cf. Ellsworth, supra note 40, at 205 (noting diverse juries’ “ability to
reflect the perspectives, experiences, and values of the ordinary people in the
community—not just the common or typical perspective, but the whole range of
viewpoints”).
53. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405–08 (2020) (requiring
unanimous verdicts under the Sixth Amendment); cf. id. at 1427 n.94 (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (observing that “when unanimity is demanded, the work of preventing
[a rogue juror from preventing a verdict] must be done in large measure by more
extensive voir dire and more aggressive use of challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges”).
54. See Smith, supra note 48 (embracing client-centered zealous advocacy).
55. Cf. Bennett, supra note 33, at 150, 160 (observing that “[f]or a variety of
reasons, judges are in a weaker position than lawyers to anticipate implicit biases

2020]

CONFRONTING THE BIAS DICHOTOMY

181

reveals safe zones of juror impartiality to the judge through party
agreement on the scope of voir dire and on individual juror qualifications.
The advocacy also sharpens disputes over impartiality when a party makes
or requests case-specific inquiries of jurors, or when that information
animates challenges to whether a juror may, in fact, be biased. This
advocacy, importantly, is always a two-way street in the adversarial
system. Opposing counsel, therefore, can be quite active in using the voir
dire process to contextualize or counter the other party’s claim that a
prospective juror is biased.56 In this way, the adversarial system depends
on bias from competent and diligent lawyers to investigate and reveal, and
also to counter and resolve, concerns over potential juror bias.
This adversarial process initially informs the challenge-for-cause
system through which the parties have a right to remove biased jurors.57
These challenges, however, are often inadequate to the full task of
ensuring an impartial jury.58 The legal standard of removal for cause is
high,59 and “[t]rial judges have much discretion in conducting voir dire and

in jurors and determine how those biases might affect the case,” including the fact
that the “lawyers almost always know the case better than the trial judge”).
56. Juror “rehabilitation,” for example, is a common tactic for experienced
trial lawyers and judges to retain jurors who have expressed bias. See, e.g., Patrick
T. Barone & Michael B. Skinner, Breaking the Spell of the Magic Question
During Voir Dire, 39 CHAMPION 22 (2015) (examining judicial rehabilitation of
jurors, and arguing that “[i]mproper rehabilitation always corrupts the jury trial
process, but it prejudices criminal defendants much more often than the
prosecution because there is a stronger initial bias against them. Either way,
however, the result is the same—a corruption of the solemn right to a trial by an
impartial jury”); Connie Henderson, Your Honor, Stop Screwing Up My Voir
Dire!, WARRIOR, at 42, 43 (Winter 2016), available at https://www.triallawyers
college.org/media/5164/henderson_connie_voirdire.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VSM
-UMBX] (discussing the “evils of juror rehabilitation” by trial judges, and
exploring advocate strategies to counter it after exposing juror bias). For a study
on the effectiveness of judicial rehabilitation of jurors, see Caroline B. Crocker &
Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects of Rehabilitative Voir Dire on Juror Bias and
Decision Making, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 212 (2010).
57. See sources cited supra note 33.
58. Jolly, supra note 9.
59. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985) (requiring challenge
for cause when a prospective juror’s state of mind would “prevent or substantially
impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions
and oath”); see, e.g., United States v. Salamone, 800 F.2d 1216, 1225–27 (1986)
(rejecting that jurors’ membership in the National Rifle Association and other
anti-gun control organizations implicitly demonstrated bias in a criminal case
involving implementation of gun control statutes).
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identifying and striking unqualified jurors.”60 Casebooks are replete with
examples of judges denying the defendant a challenge for cause with a
juror who expressed reservations about being impartial because the juror
promised to follow judicial instructions or to be fair.61 These sanitizing
“expurgatory oaths”62 offered by jurors may follow active rehabilitation of
the challenged juror by the prosecutor or even the trial judge.63

60. Jolly, supra note 9, at 736; see Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038
(1984) (noting “special deference” afforded to trial judge’s determination of juror
credibility and demeanor); State v. Holliday, No. 2017-KA-01921, 2020 WL
500475, at *14–18 (La. Jan. 29, 2020) (noting broad discretion for trial court to
determine scope of void dire and rule on challenges for cause).
61. See C.J. Williams, To Tell You the Truth, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 24(c) Should be Amended to Permit Attorneys to Conduct Voir Dire of
Prospective Jurors, 67 S.C. L. REV. 35, 44 n.67 (2015) (observing that
“[p]rospective jurors often assert they can be fair and impartial, despite their
beliefs, and that is generally sufficient to defeat challenges for cause,” and
collecting cases).
62. See People v. Arnold, 753 N.E.2d 846, 850–51 (N.Y. 2000) (explaining
that “a juror who has revealed doubt, because of prior knowledge or opinion,
about her ability to serve impartially must be excused unless the juror states
unequivocally on the record that she can be fair. While the [law] does not require
any particular expurgatory oath or ‘talismanic’ words . . . jurors must clearly
express that any prior experiences or opinions that reveal the potential for bias
will not prevent them from reaching an impartial verdict”); People v. Harris, 689
N.Y.S.2d 598, 598 (App. Term 1998) (observing that “[w]here a prospective juror
reveals knowledge or expresses an opinion that creates a doubt regarding his or
her ability or willingness to judge the case impartially and solely upon the
evidence admitted at trial, the juror must be excused, unless the juror is willing to
state unequivocally that prior knowledge or opinion will not influence his or her
verdict and that it will be rendered impartially, solely upon the evidence. This is
sometimes called an ‘expurgatory oath’”).
63. A common example from my experience might proceed as follows,
perhaps following voir dire by the trial judge on the defendant’s presumption of
innocence and the prosecution’s burden of proof:
Lawyer: Juror X, your response indicated you may have some
reservations about presuming my client is innocent when the prosecution
has accused him of a crime. That’s understandable. But despite those
reservations, can you promise my client that you will presume this
accusation is wrong and he is innocent, and will not convict him unless
the district attorney proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?
Juror X: I’m not sure I can. Your client’s been charged with a serious
crime. That wouldn’t happen for no reason. I feel like your client should
say something if he is innocent.
Lawyer: Thank you, Juror X.
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Alternatively, the trial judge may simply restrict the allotted time and
questions in voir dire so that the lawyer cannot develop an adequate record
for a challenge for cause except for a few jurors.64 Voir dire also depends
heavily on an honor system for jurors responding to questions from judges
and lawyers. The challenge-for-cause system thus fails to address juror
biases that a juror is unwilling to disclose,65 especially to a judicial officer
in a formal court proceeding.66
Beyond these limitations in addressing explicit juror bias, the
challenge-for-cause standard is deficient by design in its ability to detect
implicit juror biases—those biases that a juror holds unconsciously that

Court: Well, Juror X, let me ask you this question: If I instruct you that
the law requires you to presume the defendant’s innocence unless and
until the State proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, will you
follow my instructions?
Juror X: Oh, yes, Your Honor, of course I will.
Whatever the accuracy of this juror’s response to the judge’s question, this juror
likely no longer could be struck for cause. The defense lawyer nevertheless retains
legitimate reasons to question whether this juror will be impartial toward her
client in serving as a check on governmental power.
64. See Roberts, supra note 11, at 844–45; Bennett, supra note 33, at 160–61
(both examining the reluctance of some jurors to respond candidly to judicial
questions about their biases, or to respond at all, when a candid response may be
viewed as socially undesirable or as disappointing the judge).
65. I have suspected this potential dynamic many times during jury selection.
For example, in a case I tried in the Bronx in the 1990s, my client was charged
with attempted murder of four Bronx police officers in a shootout that followed
an alleged taxicab robbery. A prospective juror during one round of voir dire was
a police officer from another Bronx precinct. During voir dire, the prosecutor
asked the officer, “Can you be fair to the defendant and keep an open mind even
though she is accused of trying to murder other police officers?” The officer
replied without hesitation, “I absolutely can.” The prosecutor followed up, “Will
you give the police witnesses any special weight because they are police
officers?” “No,” the officer responded, “I will treat all the witnesses the same.”
Call me a skeptic, but I did not buy it. Nor did my client. But I also could not
eliminate this seemingly likely juror bias with a challenge for cause unless I could
persuade the judge that the officer was not credible in his responses. I was not
successful.
66. Bennett, supra note 33, at 160; Roberts, supra note 11, at 844–46
(exploring reasons why jurors may not disclose explicit biases during voir dire);
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611,
1675 (1985) (explaining that “jurors would naturally be reluctant to admit
[discriminatory views], particularly since they know that social disapproval will
be publicly expressed by dismissing them from the venire”).
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may affect the juror’s judgment and decisions.67 These undisclosed,
implicit biases, which fall wholly outside the scope of a challenge for
cause, often include race, gender, or other invidious biases.68 These
undisclosed biases, although largely invisible to judicial review, can be
critical to a criminal defendant’s ability to secure a fair trial.69 One scholar
recently found that “racial disparities pervade the exercise of challenges
for cause,” with little judicial oversight.70
For these reasons, the law in every jurisdiction affords criminal
defendants and other parties a specified number of peremptory
challenges.71 A party need not offer any reason for a peremptory
challenge.72 The goal of the peremptory challenge is for parties to bring
their case-specific knowledge and interests to bear on a limited number of
prospective jurors who may be biased but who fall below the radar of a
challenge for cause.73 The Constitution does not provide a right to
67. “Implicit social cognition is a branch of psychology that studies how
mental processes that occur outside of awareness and that operate without
conscious control can affect judgments about and behaviors toward social
groups.” L. Song Richardson & Phillip A. Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public
Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2629 (2013). See State v. Saintcalle, 309
P.3d 326, 353 (Wash. 2013) (González, J., concurring) (noting that “[j]urors
sometimes conceal or are ignorant of their own biases”); Roberts, supra note 11,
at 829 (observing that “[c]urrent doctrine fails to address the fact that jurors harbor
not only explicit, or conscious bias, but also implicit, or unconscious bias”);
Bennett, supra note 33, at 151–60 (exploring the science of implicit bias, and
concluding that “judge-dominated” voir dire “does not begin to address implicit
bias, which by its nature is not consciously known to the prospective juror”).
68. See Richardson & Goff, supra note 67, at 2629–31 (explaining
occurrence, prevalence, and power of implicit racial biases, with sources).
69. Roberts, supra note 11; Johnson, supra note 66 (expressing concern for
these powerful biases evading challenge-for-cause system).
70. Thomas Frampton, For Cause: Rethinking Racial Exclusion and the
American Jury, 118 MICH. L. REV. 785, 788 (2020) (emphasis added).
71. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24; WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 6.4 (2020);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25(1) (LexisNexis 2020).
72. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.25(1) (providing that “[a]
peremptory challenge is an objection to a prospective juror for which no reason
need be assigned. Upon any peremptory challenge, the court must exclude the
person challenged from service”).
73. See generally Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965). One scholar
has collected four traditional justifications for peremptory challenges:
First, the peremptory challenge allows the litigants to “eliminate
extremes of partiality” on the venire. Accordingly, at least in theory, it
operates to secure for the litigants a fair and impartial jury. Second, it
gives the parties some control over the jury selection process and thereby
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peremptory challenges,74 and the limited number of these challenges
requires a lawyer to be strategic in deploying them across the panel of
prospective jurors. Nevertheless, these challenges afford each party an
important opportunity: to contribute to jury impartiality that, unlike a
challenge for cause, is not subject to judicial approval of that party’s
concerns for impartiality.
The problem with peremptory challenges, however, is that their
opacity makes them unaccountable.75 In the influential article The Jim
Crow Jury,76 Professor Thomas Ward Frampton reviewed why and how
the peremptory challenge has become a primary tool for racial and other
invidious discrimination against jurors.77 Working from a robust dataset
on jury selection practices in Louisiana, Professor Frampton concluded
that “[p]rosecutors wield both peremptory strikes and for-cause challenges
to eliminate black jurors at an extraordinarily disproportionate rate, and
they do so with greater frequency when prosecuting black defendants.”78
This study further found that prosecutors do not exercise a monopoly on
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges. Defense lawyers
enhances the litigants’ confidence in the proceedings and respect for the
jury’s ultimate verdict. Third, it permits litigants to probe for biases
during voir dire without fear of alienating a potential juror. Even if no
grounds for a challenge for cause appear, the litigant can exercise a
peremptory challenge to exclude a panelist who may have been
antagonized by the litigant’s questioning. Fourth, it serves as a safety net
of sorts for those instances when the challenge for cause is wrongly
denied or cannot be demonstrated, but the litigant still believes that the
jury panelist harbors bias.
Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge: Voir Dire
By Questionnaire and the ‘Blind’ Peremptory Challenge, 29 U. MICH. J. L.
REFORM 981, 985–86 (1996).
74. See Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (holding that
“[t]here is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires the
Congress to grant peremptory challenges”).
75. See Fried, supra note 22, at 1314 (noting that “the unlimited discretion
historically conferred by peremptory challenges in order to facilitate the selection
of an impartial jury also provides an opportunity for race and sex discrimination”).
76. See Frampton, supra note 16. The United States Supreme Court cited to
The Jim Crow Jury in Ramos v. Louisiana in invalidating non-unanimous jury
verdicts under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Ramos v. Louisiana,
140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020).
77. See Frampton, supra note 16, at 1620–25. Racial bias, of course, is a
complex topic that has received much attention in the literature well beyond the
scope of this paper. See Sundquist, supra note 49, at 335–46 (exploring the
science of racial bias).
78. Frampton, supra note 16, at 1621–22 (internal footnote omitted).
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disproportionately strike white prospective jurors, and even more so when
representing a black client.79 “The overall equilibrium is not evidence that
the system is working,” Professor Frampton claimed, but rather “reflects
systemic, mirror-image violations of both black and white jurors’
constitutional rights.”80 Other studies of jury selection reinforce these
conclusions.81
Consequently, a critical bias dichotomy surfaces: lawyers better
minimize jurors’ unfair biases when lawyers have diverse and robust
advocacy tools for challenging jurors, including the peremptory challenge.
Yet these same tools, especially the peremptory challenge, can activate
and empower lawyer biases against otherwise qualified jurors.82 This
dichotomy presents a necessary choice to decide which bias merits more
attention from the law: whether the right of a criminal defendant to deploy
peremptory challenges in seeking an impartial jury outweighs the right of
jurors to be free from discrimination, or whether jurors’ right to freedom
from discrimination matters more than the value of the peremptory
challenge.
Batson v. Kentucky83 attempted to resolve this choice as a false
dichotomy by creating a framework for judicial regulation of peremptory
challenges. The nearly uniform view, however, is that Batson has failed in
this effort.
II. THE FAILED BATSON SOLUTION
Batson recognized the authority of trial judges to regulate peremptory
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

79. Id. at 1634–35.
80. Id. at 1635.
81. See id. at 1624–25 (summarizing other studies); see, e.g., Catherine M.
Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, Beyond Batson’s Scrutiny: A Preliminary Look at
Racial Disparities in Prosecutorial Peremptory Strikes Following the Passage of
the North Carolina Racial Justice Act, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1623, 1627–28
(2013) (discussing ongoing empirical research finding that “black qualified jurors
consistently faced a significantly higher risk of strike [by prosecutors] than all
other qualified jurors,” and noting convergence other legal and social science
research confirming “that race continues to play a role in jury selection”). For
recent examples of this discrimination in action, see, for example, Flowers v.
Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005).
82. Cf. Bennett, supra note 33, at 151 (noting value of lawyer advocacy in
reducing juror bias, but the role of peremptory challenges in empowering the
biases of lawyers).
83. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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Amendment.84 The Supreme Court grounded this rule in three interrelated
harms that racially discriminatory peremptory challenges cause: harm to
the defendant’s fair trial interests, harm to the juror’s equality interests,
and broader harm to the integrity of the legal system.85 As the Court
explained, “[R]espect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law
will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury
service because of his race.”86
The Supreme Court subsequently applied the Batson rule to govern
civil litigants87 and criminal defendants.88 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has extended Batson to sex discrimination.89 Lower courts have applied
Batson to other forms of invidious discrimination in jury selection,
including discrimination against sexual orientation,90 religious
affiliation,91 and color.92
This framework suggests a potentially robust opportunity for judicial
regulation of discriminatory peremptory challenges during jury selection.
To prevail under Batson, however, the complaining party must pass
successfully through Batson’s familiar three-stage test:
First, a [party] must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory
challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; second, if that
showing has been made, the [responding party] must offer a raceneutral basis for striking the juror in question; and third, in light
of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether
the [complaining party] has shown purposeful discrimination.93

84. See id. at 89.
85. See id. at 86–87.
86. Id. at 99.
87. See Edmondson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (applying
Batson rule to peremptory challenges by civil litigants).
88. See Georgia v. McCullom, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (applying Batson rule to
peremptory challenges by criminal defendants).
89. See J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (applying Batson to
gender discrimination).
90. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories, 740 F.3d 471
(9th Cir. 2014) (applying Batson to sexual-orientation discrimination).
91. See, e.g., In re Freeman, 133 P.3d 1013, 1023–24 (Ca. 2006); see also
Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 269–70 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)
(collecting lower-court cases).
92. See People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611, 613–15 (N.Y. 2016)
(recognizing skin color as a protected Batson classification in addition to race,
gender, and ethnicity).
93. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 475 (2008).
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This Batson framework has generated what one scholar has
characterized as “withering criticism”94 of the rule’s ability to
meaningfully regulate the lawyer side of the bias dichotomy in jury
selection. The bases for this criticism abound, but it often focuses on five
concerns, several of which Justice Thurgood Marshall himself anticipated
in the Batson decision: (1) the requirement of lawyer intent to discriminate
against the challenged juror is a difficult evidentiary standard to meet in
the jury selection context95 and does little to nothing to address implicit
lawyer bias in using peremptory challenges;96 (2) the structure and content
of Batson’s three-stage test easily permits a guilty lawyer to hide a
discriminatory strike behind a host of flimsy but legally satisfactory “race
neutral” reasons for the strike;97 (3) some trial judges may be reluctant to
acknowledge Batson violations, because the required pretext finding under
the third stage of analysis implies that the lawyer is a deceptive racist;98
94. Frampton, supra note 16, at 1623.
95. Cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 105 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (observing that “defendants cannot attack the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges at all unless the challenges are so flagrant as to establish a
prima facie case”).
96. Cf. id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“Nor is outright prevarication by
prosecutors the only danger here. ‘[I]t is even possible that an attorney may lie to
himself in an effort to convince himself that his motives are legal.’ A prosecutor’s
own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that
a prospective black juror is ‘sullen,’ or ‘distant,’ a characterization that would not
come to his mind if a white juror had acted identically.”) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted); see also State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 335 (Wash. 2013).
97. Cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 105–06 (observing that “[i]f such easily generated
explanations are sufficient to discharge the prosecutor’s obligation to justify his
strikes on nonracial grounds, then the protection erected by the Court today may
be illusory”); Wright, Chavis & Parks, supra note 28, at 1413–14 (observing that
“it is too easy for attorneys to fabricate race-neutral reasons, after the fact, to
exclude minority jurors”); Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 81, at 1631–32
(confirming that prosecutor regularly evade Batson with racial neutral
explanations for discriminatory strikes); Jeffrey Bellin & Juninho P. Semitsu,
Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the Unapologetically Bigoted or
Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1090–1105 (2011)
(reviewing federal Batson decisions from 2000 to 2009).
98. See Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 338 (observing that “[a] requirement of
conscious discrimination is especially disconcerting because it seemingly requires
judges to accuse attorneys of deceit and racism in order to sustain a Batson
challenge”); cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring) (commenting
that “[a] judge’s own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him to accept [a
lawyer’s] explanation as well supported”); Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 97, at
1113. An inference of unethical discrimination from a Batson violation is not
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(4) Batson does not enhance jury diversity, because it embraces a
“colorblind” ethos;99 and (5) appellate courts defer heavily to the trial
judge’s resolution of these issues of lawyer credibility.100 The net
perspective on Batson might be best captured by one law review article’s
revealing title: Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than the
Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney.101
These valid critiques of Batson have prompted creative judicial and
academic proposals to modify and improve the Batson rule.102 The
intensifying critiques of Batson, however, have also invited renewed calls

necessary as a disciplinary matter. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
8.4(g) cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (providing that “[a] trial judge’s finding that
peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone
establish a violation of paragraph (g)”).
99. See Tetlow, supra note 33, at 1714–15 (arguing that “Batson does not
value diversity at all. Instead, Batson held unconstitutional the very idea that race
and gender predict belief. . . . Batson [thus] actually interferes with the quest for
jury impartiality”); see also Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 334 (noting that “[a] growing
body of evidence shows that Batson has done very little to make juries more
diverse”).
100. See Wright, Chavis & Parks, supra note 28, at 1412, 1414 n.6 (observing
that “appellate courts rarely reverse convictions based on Batson claims”).
101. See Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 97. One section heading in this article
is also colorfully titled, “Jurors are more likely to be struck by lightning than to
be struck by a violator of the Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 1102; see also
Grosso & O’Brien, supra note 81, at 1628 (noting convergence in legal and social
science literature “that race continues to play a role in jury selection
notwithstanding Batson’s prohibition”).
102. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124, 1131–32 (Wash.
2017) (adopting “bright-line” rule that “the peremptory strike of a juror who is the
only member of a cognizable racial group on a jury panel constitutes a prima facie
showing of racial motivation” under Batson). For several academic proposals to
reform Batson standards or procedures, see, for example, Bellin & Semitsu, supra
note 97, at 1106–09 (summarizing proposals); Roberts, supra note 11, at 873–74
(implicit bias testing); Jen C. Griebat, Peremptory Challenge by Blind
Questionnaire: The Most Practical Solutions for Ending the Problem of
Racialized Discrimination in Kansas Courts While Preserving the Necessary
Function of the Peremptory Challenge, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 323, 337–38
(2003) (proposing blind questioning system for jury selection); Brian W. Stoltz,
Rethinking the Peremptory Challenge: Letting Lawyers Enforce the Principles of
Batson, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1047 (2007) (proposing peremptory “block”
system by lawyers); Montoya, supra note 73, at 1115–25 (proposing voir dire
questionnaire with blind peremptory challenges).
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to eliminate the peremptory challenge.103 One of the most compelling calls
was delivered by Washington Supreme Court Justice Steven González in
his influential concurring opinion to that court’s decision in State v.
Saintcalle.104 This Article, therefore, will explore Justice González’s
opinion as an exemplar of the strongest critiques of the peremptory
challenge under the Batson regime.
In Saintcalle, the Washington Supreme Court majority recognized the
many shortcomings of the Batson rule in regulating lawyer bias: “‘[T]he
fact of racial and ethnic disproportionality in [Washington’s] criminal
justice system is indisputable.’”105 The court noted, however, that “[a]
growing body of evidence shows that Batson has done very little to make
juries more diverse or prevent prosecutors from exercising race-based
challenges.”106 To illustrate, the court acknowledged that “[in] over 40
cases since Batson, Washington appellate courts have never reversed a
conviction based on a trial court’s erroneous denial of a Batson
challenge.”107 The court also lamented that Batson does not reach the
prevalent dynamic of “unconscious prejudice and implicit bias.”108
Nevertheless, the court was reluctant to decide whether and how to reform
Batson in a litigated case in which the parties had not briefed the issue.109
103. See cases cited supra note 18. These calls are not entirely new. Justice
Thurgood Marshall himself called to abolish the peremptory challenge in Batson
itself. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring) (“The decision
today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the juryselection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory
challenges entirely.”). In Batson, the Supreme Court was addressing peremptory
challenges by the prosecution. Nevertheless, Justice Marshall further observed,
“The potential for racial prejudice, further, inheres in the defendant’s challenge
as well. If the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge could be eliminated only at the
cost of eliminating the defendant’s challenge as well, I do not think that would be
too great a price to pay.” Id. at 108. Interestingly, in the recent Supreme Court
decision invalidating non-unanimous verdicts under the Sixth Amendment,
Justice Kavanaugh analogized non-unanimous jury verdict rules to discriminatory
peremptory challenges. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414–18 (2020)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (noting, after reviewing the racist history of
Louisiana and Oregon’s non-unanimous jury verdict rule, that “[i]n effect, the
non-unanimous jury allows backdoor and unreviewable peremptory strikes
against up to 2 of the 12 jurors”).
104. State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326 (Wash. 2013).
105. Id. at 334.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 335.
109. Id. at 337.
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Accordingly, the court deferred the question to a future case or even the
court’s administrative rule-making process.110
Justice González was less enamored of waiting than the majority.111
Instead, Justice González argued that the court had a duty to “ensure that
none of our trial procedures propagate injustice.”112 In detailing the ways
in which peremptory challenges propagate injustice, Justice González first
situated the peremptory challenge historically in a process where
challenges for cause “remain[] the primary method by which we ensure
impartial juries,”113 juror impartiality means an ability to “follow
instructions on the law,”114 and trial judges have significant discretion in
evaluating whether a juror is impartial.115 Justice González thus framed the
peremptory challenge as a historical supplement.116
In Justice González’s view, this supplement in practice no longer
fulfills its purpose of enhancing jury impartiality.117 Instead, lawyers
“simply use peremptory challenges to remove the prospective jurors they
perceive to be least favorable to their position, regardless of whether such
prospective jurors possess biases so severe as to render their participation
unfair.”118 The goal is to maximize juror “favoritism,” especially in “close
cases.”119 Justice Gonźalez questioned whether an empirical basis even
supports this partisan effort by lawyers. Instead, drawing on several
sources of methods of trial practice, Justice González concluded that
lawyers’ peremptory-challenge strategies “all rely heavily on stereotypes
and generalizations” and “superficial judgments, notwithstanding the fact
that whatever directly relevant information is available either provides no
indication that the prospective juror is unqualified or provides some
indication that is only fairly debatable at best.”120 Empirical studies
indicate that lawyers, even when guided by jury selection experts, are not
particularly effective, “even for the adversarial purpose of excluding
unfavorable jurors.”121
110. Id. at 338.
111. See id. at 347 (González, J., concurring) (noting that “[r]acial bias in jury
selection is still a problem—‘Solutions to the Problem, Of Course, wait’”).
112. Id. at 349.
113. Id. at 352.
114. Id. at 351.
115. Id. at 352.
116. Id. at 352, 366–67.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 353.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 353–55.
121. Id. at 363–65.
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This dynamic unsurprisingly prompts some lawyers to rely on racial
and other invidious biases as a shortcut. Justice González identified several
types of explicit and implicit racial bias that can inform lawyer intuition
in striking jurors: (1) “straightforward, race-based stereotype or
generalization”;122 (2) “a simple or complex statistical juror profile that
incorporates race as an indicator of favorability”;123 (3) “a desire to obtain
a particular racial dynamic on the jury as a whole”;124 and (4) “unconscious
racial bias.”125 Justice González concluded that these racial biases are
widespread and “occurring regularly” in jury selection.126 This conclusion
was reinforced with several studies,127 including a survey of Washington
lawyers that revealed that “42.6 percent of surveyed lawyers reported that
prosecutors in Washington either ‘sometimes’ or ‘often’ use peremptory
challenges to systematically exclude minorities from juries.”128
Batson, Justice González concluded, “cannot effectively combat the
widespread racial discrimination that underlies the use of peremptory
challenges throughout this state, and thus, such racial discrimination will
122. Id. at 355.
123. Id. at 356.
124. Id.
125. Id. This catalogue of racial biases that apparently are impermissible in
jury selection implies a fairly “colorblind” theory of juror impartiality. This theory
does hold some jurisprudential currency. Cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”);
cf. id. at 782 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that “‘[o]ur Constitution is colorblind’”). But cf. id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing for race-conscious
decision-making when necessary and narrowly tailored to eliminate racial
segregation in public schools). Not everyone would agree that color-blind jury
selection always produces racial justice. For example, in critiquing Batson
jurisprudence, Professor Tania Tetlow has argued as follows:
the Court purports to solve the problem of endemic jury discrimination
by simply mandating a state of denial about it. The Court actually forbids
any presumption that justice might turn on race. Because it would prove
too ‘divisive’ to recognize the proven realities of jury discrimination, the
Court instead works to force an aspirational colorblindness onto the
lawyers selecting the jury.
Tetlow, supra note 33, at 1714 (internal footnotes omitted); cf. Wright, Chavis &
Parks, supra note 28, at 1430 (empirical study finding that “juries with more white
men were more likely to convict, particularly when the defendant was a black
man. Thus, it is easy to see why defense attorneys might want to save more of
their peremptory challenges for white male jurors”).
126. See Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 356–57 (González, J., concurring).
127. See id. at 356–58.
128. Id. at 357–58.

2020]

CONFRONTING THE BIAS DICHOTOMY

193

continue unabated.”129 Peremptory challenges thus cause numerous harms:
the strikes perpetuate the “underrepresentation of minority groups on
juries,”130 impose “substantial administrative and litigation costs,”131
produce “less effective and less productive” juries,132 and “amplif[y]
underlying resource disparity among litigants in a way that brings
fundamental fairness into question.”133
Justice González acknowledged that “peremptory challenges are not
always harmful or pernicious.”134 However, in Justice González’s view,
“trial and appellate courts cannot reliably identify which particular
challenges involve racial discrimination and which do not.”135
Accordingly, Justice González concluded, “Abolishing peremptory
challenges is constitutionally required, given the need to prevent racial
discrimination and the lack of any justification for allowing peremptory
challenges.”136 Alternatively, Justice González noted, “If we do not
abolish peremptory challenges, we should at least take steps to augment
the effectiveness of the current jury selection process under Batson.”137
Justice González’s Saintcalle opinion has justifiably been influential,
including on the Washington Supreme Court itself.138 This opinion also
has garnered attention from jurists and academics around the country,
prompting renewed assessment of whether the time has arrived to
eliminate the peremptory challenge from the lexicon of jury selection.139
Despite the compelling rationales proffered by Justice González and other
critics, the record may not yet justify eliminating the peremptory challenge
altogether, at least if criminal defense peremptories are to be buried in the
same casket with prosecution peremptories.
129. Id. at 358.
130. Id. at 362.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 363.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 348.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 367.
137. Id. at 369.
138. See City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124, 1134 (Wash. 2017) (Yu,
J., concurring) (“I now join Justice González in calling for the complete
abolishment of peremptory challenges.”).
139. See, e.g., State v. Holmes, 221 A.3d 407, 438 n.28 (Conn. 2019); id. at
441 (Mullins, J., concurring) (both citing to Saintcalle and Justice González’s
concurring opinion in evaluating peremptory challenge reforms); State v. Veal,
930 N.W.2d 319, 356–58 (Iowa 2019) (Appel, J., concurring) (analyzing
Saintcalle decision and Justice González’s concurring opinion in assessing the
future of the peremptory challenge under Batson).
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III. A CAUTIOUS DEFENSE OF THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
In responding to critiques of the peremptory challenge, this Article
will not repeat well-established rationales that have been explored
elsewhere.140 Nor, in the face of Saintcalle’s persuasive knocks against the
peremptory challenge, will this Article offer much of a defense for
prosecution peremptory strikes. The prosecution already may come into
jury selection benefitting from juror biases trending more in its favor.141
Moreover, the state carries a continuing legacy of racial discrimination in
almost every facet of its criminal law system, including in the peremptory
challenge, operating as a system of oppression and control against racial
minorities.142 Not a great equation for lauding the peremptory challenge’s
value in the face of compelling critiques of this practice.
A criminal defendant, by contrast, stands in a distinct position as the
very object of the state’s desire to punish and control. Consequently, a
zero-sum solution to the bias dichotomy, such as the abolition of
peremptory challenges, may cause distinct harm. These harms should be
weighed carefully before the same party seeking to punish a criminal
defendant can strip the defendant of such a well-established tool to assure
an unbiased jury will hear the State’s accusation. While Justice González
persuasively demonstrates in Saintcalle the many vices of this jury
selection tool, even when used by criminal defendants, those vices may
not operate “without substantiated benefits.”143
To be clear, I am not advocating for special license for criminal
defense lawyers to discriminate against jurors on the basis of race, sex,
sexual orientation, gender identity, color, or other protected classification.
Criminal defense lawyers are trained to fight against these biases, not to
exacerbate them, and the rules of ethics quite properly subject all lawyers

140. See generally Montoya, supra note 73, at 985–86 (identifying four
traditional justifications for the peremptory challenge).
141. Cf. William S. Neilson & Harold Winter, Bias and the Economics of Jury
Selection, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 223, 241 (2000) (observing that “for a
defendant clearly in the minority . . . the only tradeoff to consider when awarding
peremptory challenges is that between a decrease in the probability of a hung jury
and an increase in the probability of a wrongful conviction”).
142. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 24. Cf. Butler, supra note 15
(exploring both the individual racism and structural white supremacy embedded
in the criminal law system, with examples); see also Sundquist, supra note 49, at
314 (sharing data about racial biases in the criminal law system across multiple
data points).
143. State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 350 (Wash. 2013). (González, J.,
concurring).
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to this limit on zealous advocacy.144 I, therefore, agree that “[r]acial
discrimination in the qualification or selection of jurors offends the dignity
of persons and the integrity of the courts.”145
By eliminating the peremptory challenge, however, the law would
impose a prophylactic solution to the bias dichotomy that would eliminate
non-discriminatory peremptory challenges along with discriminatory
challenges.146 Yet, this proposal adds nothing new to lawyers’ advocacy
toolkit for identifying and removing harmful juror biases that can unfairly
skew outcomes.147 Lawyers will rely on judge-determined challenges for
cause, yet as one experienced jurist has observed:
Because lawyers almost always know the case better than the trial
judge, lawyers are in the best position to determine how explicit
and implicit biases among potential jurors might affect the
outcome. . . . [T]he trial judge is probably the person in the
courtroom least able to discover implicit bias by questioning
jurors.148
To illustrate in even more practical terms: while the judge is
evaluating whether jurors can be generally impartial in a sexual assault
case, the defense lawyer is evaluating whether the jurors will respond
fairly and critically to the anticipated cross-examination of the victim and
will listen fairly to the client’s testimony, including cross-examination.
The current challenge-for-cause system cannot realistically capture these
juror biases.149 A decision to eliminate peremptory challenges, therefore,

144. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980);
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.6 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 4th ed. 2017) (providing ethical duty for defense counsel to refrain from
invidious bias, to eliminate those biases, and to detect, investigate, and eliminate
“historically persistent biases like race, in all of counsel’s work”).
145. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 332–33.
146. See id. at 348 (acknowledging that “peremptory challenges are not always
harmful or pernicious”).
147. See Sundquist, supra note 49, at 345 (noting that “racial bias on the jury
has long been found to be clearly associated with distorted trial outcomes,” and
even “can exert a causal effect on trial outcomes in some cases,” and especially
can “impact decision-making with regard to guilt and the interpretation of
ambiguous evidence”).
148. Bennett, supra note 33, at 160; Williams, supra note 61, at 61 (observing
that “a trial judge will not know the case at the bar anywhere near as well as the
lawyers trying the case”).
149. See Bennett, supra note 33, at 159–61.
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may codify only that lawyers “worry more about discrimination against
jurors than about discrimination by jurors.”150
Justice González appears to hold a skeptical view, however, of the
goal of peremptory challenges and their value to juror impartiality:
[A]ttorneys use peremptory challenges to exclude unfavorable
jurors, not to obtain an impartial jury. Peremptory challenges are
used to remove prospective jurors who are qualified but who the
attorney believes will be relatively unfavorable in what is
probably a close case. That has nothing to do with furthering
impartiality in our justice system.151
Even if this perspective is accurate in some cases, we should be clear
about who unilaterally will decide juror qualifications and select the jury
if lawyers have no peremptory challenges. Judges would pick the juries,
as the selection of all trial jurors would depend entirely on challenges for
cause, which depend on judicial permission.
Judges in criminal cases are agents of the same State that is also
prosecuting the defendant.152 Judges may have a different role than
prosecutors, and judges and prosecutors may not feel like they are on the
same team some days. Judges, however, are state actors nevertheless.153
For example, the judge will enter a guilty verdict from the jury to give that
condemnation the force of law, and the judge will finalize the judgment
by imposing a sentence.154 Many judges run for public election, and
oftentimes these elections can include the typical themes of “criminal
justice” for the public’s safety.155 Other judges are appointed by an
150. Tetlow, supra note 33, at 1715 (emphasis added).
151. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 363 (González, J., concurring).
152. This fact is precisely why the Supreme Court concluded that a defense
peremptory challenge satisfies the state-action requirement for an equal protection
violation against the removed juror. See Georgia v. McCullom, 505 U.S. 42, 51–
55 (1992).
153. See id.
154. See Bradley v. United States, 410 U.S. 605, 609 (1973) (noting that
“‘[f]inal judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the
judgment.’ . . . In the legal sense, a prosecution terminates only when sentence is
imposed”).
155. See Keith Swisher, Pro-Prosecution Judges: “Tough on Crime,” Soft on
Strategy, Ripe for Disqualification, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 328 (2010) (observing
that “the tough-on-crime message, or some derivation thereof, is among the most,
if not the most, prevalent in judicial campaigns,” and that “[i]n one study of the
2000 judicial elections in four states . . . crime control or cracking down on
criminals was the most frequent theme in televised causing advertisements”). A
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executive officer who occupies the same branch of government as the
prosecutor seeking to convict the defendant.156 Eliminating the peremptory
challenge thus would prevent defendants from having any say in their jury
of peers, unless the defendant wins permission from a state actor.
In the United States criminal law system, with its legacy of statesanctioned discrimination and mass incarceration of marginalized
persons,157 I maintain significant concerns about ceding this much
unilateral control to the State over the composition of the jury. As Justice
González’s opinion itself reinforces, trial judges exercise substantial
discretion over voir dire and challenges for cause.158 The judiciary, of
course, includes many fair-minded jurists who would exercise this
discretion patiently and with the best intentions to secure a fair trial for the
defendant, but that benevolence would be lost with the judges who are not
so fair-minded to the criminal defendant. In addition, any experienced trial
lawyer can tell stories about trial judges who have exerted a heavy hand in
controlling jury selection, maybe just for the sake of efficiency or perhaps
for a preferred jury composition, against which only the peremptory
challenge can defend.159
Moreover, even the most fair-minded judge can suffer from implicit
biases—a human affliction that also influences judicial decisionmaking.160 If we acknowledge that voir dire and challenges for cause are
simple review of campaign videos on YouTube for judges in partisan judicial
election states, such as Alabama, offers some colorful examples. See Content
Creative Media, Judge Sarah Stewart, Alabama Supreme Court – “Matters,”
YOUTUBE (Jan. 17, 2019), https://youtu.be/0cx04p4rzqA [https://perma.cc/GX
Q4-PX3F] (portraying candidate as a pro-Trump judge who will “guard our nation
against evil-doers”); Strategic Impact, GREG SHAW: TRUMP TOUGH,
YOUTUBE (Feb. 17, 2020), https://youtu.be/OYOJxATAva8 [https://perma.cc/
Q98R-35BZ].
156. Cf. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 4.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010)
(setting ethical responsibilities for candidates for appointment to judicial office).
157. See supra notes 15–17, 81, and 142.
158. See supra note 115.
159. Cf. Henderson, supra note 56; Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 1, 54 (1994) (noting the importance of peremptory challenge for
lawyers to address jury bias, despite and even in the face of judicial inquiry).
160. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (referring to “[a] judge’s own conscious or unconscious racism”);
State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 343 (Iowa 2019) (Appel, J., concurring) (“[A]ll
of us—judges, lawyers, legislators, and jurors—have unconscious or implicit
biases”); Michael B. Hyman, Implicit Bias in the Courts, 102 ILL. B.J. 40, 42–43
(2014) (noting role of implicit bias in all courtroom actors, including judges who,
“like everyone else, harbor their own set of implicit biases, shaped by their life
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highly discretionary decisions by trial judges to which appellate courts will
defer,161 we should maintain an independent bias check to prevent the trial
judge from skewing jury selection, even unintentionally. However, many
of the calls to eliminate peremptory challenges by lawyers appear to imply
superior judicial neutrality in selecting jurors, who themselves also are
presumptively unbiased, including on matters such as race and gender.162
That neutrality is not realistic or supported.163 For example, studies on
racial disparities in jury selection are not much friendlier to the bench than
they are to the bar.164 Studies similarly show how upcoming elections or
experiences and identity”); Bennett, supra note 33, at 157–58 (reviewing studies
demonstrating judicial implicit bias, including racial bias, because “judges rely
heavily on intuitive faculties when deciding traditional problems from the
bench”); cf. LETTER OF WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT TO THE JUDICIARY AND
LEGAL COMMUNITY (June 4, 2020), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/public
Upload/Supreme%20Court%20News/Judiciary%20Legal%20Community%20SI
GNED%20060420.pdf [https://perma.cc/MMT6-K8CC] (acknowledging both
“conscious and unconscious biases” in the judiciary as part of the court’s
commitment to “achieving justice by ending racism”).
161. See supra note 61.
162. Cf. City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124, 1134 (Wash. 2017) (Yu,
J., concurring) (advocating that law should presume that all prospective jurors are
“qualified” unless proven otherwise by a challenge for cause); State v. Saintcalle,
309 P.3d 326, 369 (Wash. 2013) (González, J., concurring) (deferring to judicial
discretion and control in supervising voir dire and ruling on challenges for cause
and describing rulings on challenge for cause as discernibly “objective”).
163. Cf. Nugent, supra note 159, at 5 (observing that through “blind faith in
their impartiality . . . judges may gain a false sense of confidence in their
decisions”).
164. See Frampton, supra note 70, at 790 (discussing research that revealed
that “through challenges for cause . . . prosecutors allege (and judges confirm)
that black jurors remain less ‘qualified’ than white jurors to participate in an
institution frequently touted as central to American democracy”); Wright, Chavis
& Parks, supra note 28, at 1426, 1430 (reporting empirical study of jury selection
practices, finding that “[t]he data show that judges removed nonwhite jurors at a
higher rate than they did for white jurors,” and inferring, inter alia, that “[t]he
higher rate of judicial removals for cause for nonwhite jurors might also reveal
how judges align themselves with prosecutors, and respond more favorably to
their requested removals for cause”). A recent survey by the National Judicial
College happily reported that “65 percent of the 634 judges who responded
answered yes to the question, ‘Do you believe that systemic racism exists in the
criminal justice system?’” See Anna-Leigh Firth, Most judges believe the criminal
justice system suffers from racism,” NAT’L JUD. C. (July 14, 2020),
https://www.judges.org/news-and-info/most-judges-believe-the-criminal-justicesystem-suffers-from-racism/ [https://perma.cc/TBQ6-Y4MM]. This story,
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appointment decisions can influence judicial decision-making, especially
in the area of criminal law.165 In the adversarial system, a party who
intimately knows the theory of the case and the strengths and weaknesses
of evidence might serve as an effective ballast to other biases influencing
the jury’s composition, including the judge’s own.166
The peremptory challenge thus offers a critical virtue in criminal
cases: it reinforces the jury’s independence by preventing the State,
intentionally or unintentionally, from stacking the deck.167 If a central
function of an impartial lay jury is to serve as an independent community
check on governmental power,168 one should not expect state-dominated
jury selection to be nearly as effective at producing an independent group.
If anyone will look for independent jurors, the criminal defendant will be
most on the hunt for that independence as the person the State desires to
however, thus also implicitly reports that about 222 of the 634 judges who were
surveyed do not believe that systemic racism exists in the criminal justice system.
These judges supervise jury selection, too.
165. See Kate Berry, How Judicial Elections Impact Criminal Cases,
BRENNAN CTR. JUST. (2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/how-judicial-elections-impact-criminal-cases [https://perma.cc/L32F-LF
HH] (last visited Aug. 24, 2020).
166. At a minimum, I question any legal regime that presumes a lack of bias
from judges and jurors but presumes bias from lawyers. An adversarial approach
to jury selection instead would presume that all the participants are vulnerable to
bias, and they are each responsible for checking each other’s biases.
167. Cf. Nugent, supra note 159, at 49 (noting the role of the jury as “the best
means of protecting against the operation of the individual biases of judges”).
Nevertheless, in my career, I have heard several judges claim, in one form or
another, “We could work with the first twelve in the box.” Cf. Erikson, 398 P.3d
at 1133 (Yu, J., concurring) (arguing that “[w]e should assume that all members
of the public who adhere to a summons to appear for jury service are qualified to
hear a case unless otherwise shown”). By contrast, I more rarely recall prosecutors
offering this perspective, and I cannot recall any experienced criminal defense
lawyer endorsing it, nor any civil rights lawyer, nor for that matter many
plaintiffs’ lawyers. Some evidence may reinforce my experiential anecdotes. See
Montoya, supra note 73, at 998–1003 (reporting a survey of San Diego trial
lawyers, who consistently endorsed the value of the peremptory challenge). We
should consider why these specific groups of party interests so often align in
caring about the peremptory challenge. Outside of the prosecutors, these parties
tend not to be the powerbrokers of social oppression, and more often, are on the
receiving end of it.
168. See supra note 41 and accompanying text; cf. Jenny Carroll, The Jury as
Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825, 829 (2014) (noting that a jury can “serve as a
forum for citizens to realign their own allegiances as they attempt to apply the law
to the defendant”).
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convict. The peremptory challenge does not give the defendant the
dominant voice, or even the last word, on the jury’s composition, but with
the peremptory challenge, the State lacks the last word. Lawyers thus
know that the jury is impartial, not because the judge says so, or because
a party says so, but because the adversarial process shows as much.169
Justice González emphasized, however, that lawyers may not be
nearly as accurate in using peremptory challenges for this adversarial
purpose as they think.170 Of course, peremptory strikes are not a bullseye
practice, and Justice González’s opinion raises legitimate questions about
their efficacy, even in the hands of experienced and well-resourced
lawyers.171 Even if this efficacy claim is accurate as an empirical matter,
169. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61–62 (2004) (emphasizing
the importance of adversarial testing to judicial determinations of constitutionally
required standards for a criminal conviction under the Sixth Amendment).
170. See State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 363 (Wash. 2013) (González, J.,
concurring) (asserting that “peremptory challenges are generally ineffective even
for the adversarial purpose of excluding unfavorable jurors”).
171. More comprehensive research that fully measures lawyers’ use of the
strike might be warranted to support this empirical conclusion. Trial lawyers
deploy peremptory challenges for a diverse range of reasons that are not constant
from trial to trial, or even from juror to juror. The strike, for example, might seek
to eliminate juror six, or it might seek to include juror seven by removing juror
six, or it might simply tolerate juror seven to eliminate juror six, or it might serve
to placate a nervous client or seek demographic balance, life experiences,
communication or listening skills in the jury, or many other purposes. Sometimes,
the strike simply preserves a challenge-for-cause claim on appeal. Justice
González takes the position that many of these purposes have “nothing to do with
furthering impartiality in our justice system,” Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 363
(González, J., concurring). Perhaps the concept of impartiality itself is the real
point of disagreement, although I do agree that emerging empirical research will
be important to the ultimate fate of the peremptory challenge. The Jury Sunshine
Project is an important example. See JURY SUNSHINE PROJECT, http://news
.law.wfu.edu/tag/jury-sunshine-project/ [https://perma.cc/8WWX-KXGB] (last
visited June 1, 2020). Researchers from this project have been awarded a grant to
research whether peremptory challenges improve jury impartiality, or instead
increase bias. See Award Abstract #1628538: Do Peremptory Challenges
Increase Bias on Juries?, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, https://www
.nsf.gov/awardsearch/showAward?AWD_ID=1628538 [https://perma.cc/7MUW
-FCXS] (last visited June 4, 2020) (proposed research in Minnesota courts to “test
empirically the common assumption that peremptory challenges increase the
impartiality of juries”); cf. Catherine Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Call to
Criminal Courts: Record Rules for Batson, 105 KY. L.J. 651, 662 (2017)
(emphasizing responsibility of local courts to preserve and share jury selection
data for researchers in the pursuit of mitigating racial disparities in jury selection).
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the peremptory challenge still contributes an important virtue: legitimacy.
The community accepts most criminal verdicts, even some of the most
difficult and controversial, because they are not imposed unilaterally by
agents of the state.172 To the contrary, an adversarial process in which
every participant had a voice chose the members of that community to
validate the State’s accusation. State-dominated jury selection may
diminish confidence that jury verdicts maintain the independence from
State control that animates the commitment to a lay jury system in the first
place.173
On a more local level, I cannot count the times I have exercised a
peremptory challenge against a juror who exhibited legal “impartiality”
like a pro during voir dire, because my client nevertheless feared the
juror—maybe due to a background in law enforcement or other
government position, an experience as a victim of crime, or another
personal experience that triggered my client. When we were able to
eliminate some of these jurors, my client and my client’s family and loved
ones were more consistently open to accepting the jury’s decision as
legitimate because my client had a say in the group that decided his or her
fate. This virtue of the peremptory strike accrued even if we were to deem
the strike inefficacious in terms of narrowly defined “impartiality.”
Participation and perception matter to fairness.174
172. Cf. Wright, Chavis & Parks, supra note 28, at 1431 (noting that “[j]ury
service creates a forum for popular participation criminal justice” and that “with
other more ‘favored’ people issuing the verdicts, the legitimacy of the system
suffers”).
173. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
174. Cf. JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW,
ART, AND SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY 271 (2d ed. 1990) (identifying the value
of the challenge in that the parties “consequently are more likely to be accepting
of the verdict”). But cf. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 351, 365 (González, J., concurring)
(rejecting this party-centric concern, but acknowledging the value of the
“appearance of a fairness”). Professor Akhil Reed Amar also has argued against
this party-centric role of peremptory challenges as anti-democratic: “Juries should
represent the people, not the parties.” Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten
Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1182–83 (1995). Professor
Amar, however, focused on a fair cross-section of the community as key to a
representative jury. See id. at 1182. The fair cross-section responsibility of the
State does ensure that the trial jury in its selection will draw upon a representative
group from the local community. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 359–60
(1979) (applying a fair-cross section requirement to invalidate the opt-out rule for
prospective women jurors). The parties, however, have a direct interest in the
jury’s final deliberation and decision, and the peremptory challenge only
marginally reshapes the fair cross-section into a case-specific deliberative group.
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These observations are not to say that the peremptory challenge itself
is an indispensable part of a fair trial or that critics do not make a strong
point. The case against the peremptory challenge is formidable. Rather,
the claim is that the peremptory challenge offers virtues in an adversarial,
lay-juror system beyond narrow, judicially controlled conceptions of
impartiality. Fair trial rules should not restrict themselves to best-case
scenarios of jury pool demographics and judicial jury selection practices.
The law also should account for the common and even worst-case
scenarios that place countless defendants at a disadvantage in securing
impartial and independent jurors. Before abandoning peremptory
challenges, therefore, the legal system should consider other mechanisms
that also could prevent jury selection from becoming a judge-dominated
formality that presumes a lack of bias from everyone except the parties.
One intriguing possibility for making the loss of the peremptory
challenge more palatable would be the expansion of voir dire to enhance
the challenge-for-cause system. For example, Washington Supreme Court
Justice Mary Yu has endorsed elimination of the peremptory challenge,
but she also has noted, “Because jury selection is such an important part
of trial, it may be time for us to require that counsel be afforded ample
time for thoughtful questioning of prospective jurors . . . .”175 With this
added reform to jury selection, peremptory challenges might lose their
import. Robust voir dire that permits the parties to directly engage all of
the prospective jurors, and not just the strategic few permitted by the
judge’s voir dire stopwatch, would permit much more evidence-based
advocacy on juror qualifications.176 Another helpful change involves
adding a less deferential standard of appellate review for challenges for
cause as a necessary feature to ensure that judges cannot unilaterally

This feature seems like a modest, and reasonable, accommodation to
representative democracy for a criminal defendant to have a voice in his or her
own jury of “peers.”
175. City of Seattle v. Erickson, 398 P.3d 1124, 1134 (Wash. 2017) (Yu., J.,
concurring); see also State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467, (Wash. 2018) (Yu, J.,
concurring) (calling for “complete abolishment of the peremptory challenge,
coupled with further development of our ‘for cause’ challenge jurisprudence”).
Justice González joined Justice Yu’s concurring opinions in Erickson and
Jefferson.
176. Cf. Bennett, supra note 33, at 151 (asserting that “[t]he implicit bias of
jurors can be better addressed by increased lawyer participation in voir dire, while
the implicit bias of lawyers can then be curbed by eliminating peremptory strikes
and only allowing strikes for cause”).
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dominate the jury selection process.177 A more robust record of juror voir
dire should enable less deferential appellate review.
Voir dire reform, however, would need to happen simultaneously with
the elimination of the peremptory challenge. Further, the voir dire reform
would need to have appellate teeth to enforce it, not just a gentle
recommendation of “best practices” to complement a stern elimination of
peremptories. Otherwise, one might expect from experience that the
elimination of the peremptory challenge would have the opposite effect on
voir dire. Under current law, the peremptory challenge empowers more
lawyer voir dire, because judicial voir dire alone typically does not
provide the grist that lawyers need to exercise peremptory challenges
intelligently.178 Elimination of the peremptory challenge thus could justify
curtailment of voir dire. At the same time, trial judges are often very
concerned with time and efficiency, and some judges view jury selection
as a burdensome sideshow, especially if they are skeptical about the role
of lawyer advocacy in selecting the jury.179 If trial judges are left without
peremptory challenges and no enforceable directives to enhance voir dire,

177. Cf. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d at 352 (González, J., concurring) (extolling
deference to trial judge’s challenge for cause determinations); cf. Frampton, supra
note 70, at 791 (calling for more robust judicial review of challenge-for-cause
system).
178. See Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (noting
that the purpose of voir dire is both to inform challenges for cause and to permit
intelligent peremptory challenges); Williams, supra note 61, at 45–46 (observing
that “the relationship between attorney participation in jury voir dire and attorneys
being able to exercise peremptory strikes is positive, not inverse. Jury voir dire
aids the parties in exercising peremptory strikes”).
179. This judicial skepticism is not always off-base, as not all lawyers train
and prepare for voir dire meaningfully, but many lawyers do in a way that makes
a real difference. For example, I handled a federal appeal a few year ago in an
“alien-in-possession” firearm case that another lawyer had tried to a jury. See 18
U.S.C. § 924(g)(5)(a) (2018). After judicial voir dire, the lawyers were not
successful with any challenges for cause, and the record fully supported that
outcome. The defense lawyer would have needed to be active with peremptory
challenges to remove anyone. This federal judge, however, allowed the lawyer
some time to voir dire the jury directly. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(a)(2)(A)
(permitting lawyer voir dire at judicial discretion). Due to the nature of the case,
the lawyer focused extensively but sensitively on immigration and race with
individual jurors. Within a short time, the lawyer had laid a foundation for five
successful challenges for cause to which the prosecutor could not credibly object.
My reading of this record reaffirmed my confidence in the value of zealous
advocacy in jury selection, and my concern that, without it, judge-dominated jury
selection does not as effectively reach juror bias.
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one should expect less, not more, voir dire in many, if not the majority, of
cases. This dynamic would only amplify concerns about judge-dominated
jury selection, and likely would relegate jury selection to a bureaucratic
exercise. In the alternative, an enforceable rule to enhance voir dire with
robust judicial review of challenges for cause could be an effective offset
to the loss of peremptory challenges.
In the meantime, however, gentle skepticism may be warranted before
the law concludes that criminal defendants and other vulnerable or
marginalized litigants should lose the virtues of the peremptory challenge
altogether. At the same time, Justice González and other critics have
indisputably demonstrated the vices of these challenges, and that the
parties’ right to advocate their position zealously cannot extend to
invidious discrimination against jurors. A fair jury selection system
demands an effective mechanism for judges to police discriminatory
peremptory challenges. Batson has not adequately accomplished this
objective, for all of the reasons that critics cite. Washington’s GR 37,
however, may provide lagom the law needs.180 At the least, GR 37 merits
extended study before resorting to complete abandonment of the
peremptory challenge.
IV. CONFRONTING THE BIAS DICHOTOMY . . . AGAIN:
WASHINGTON GR 37
The preceding sections of this Article may seem like extended
prologue for the main event: an endorsement of Washington’s GR 37, a
rule that materially reframes the Batson test in regulating peremptory
challenges.181 This endorsement, however, should be taken in a specific
context: not as a pit stop on a journey to the peremptory challenge’s
necessary demise, but rather, as mobilizing a response to Saintcalle’s
persuasive call for action. Instead of bluntly eliminating the peremptory
challenge even for criminal defendants, the law should more effectively
address lawyer bias in jury selection without wholly sacrificing the virtues

180. See Thomas Oppong, Lagom: How the Swedish Philosophy for Living a
Balanced, Happy Life Can Help You Live a Meaningful Life, MEDIUM (Jan. 31,
2018), https://medium.com/thrive-global/lagom-the-swedish-philosophy-for-liv
ing-a-happy-life-might-just-help-you-live-a-more-balanced-and-9bed612b4f7c
(“It means ‘Not too little. Not too much. Just right.’”).
181. GR 37 is available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/pdf/GR/
GA_GR_37_00_00.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU4F-FLR4].
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of the peremptory challenge in securing an impartial jury in the adversarial
system. GR 37’s legislative history reinforces this perspective.182
As an initial matter, GR 37 is neither legislation that reframes the
Batson rule, nor a judicial decision, but rather an administrative court rule.
The Washington Supreme Court has a history of using its administrativerule-making authority to influence the administration of justice in that
state.183 For example, the Washington Supreme Court established by
administrative court rule Washington’s influential, and controversial,
Limited License Legal Technician Program.184 The court also codified
Washington’s Indigent Defense Standards by administrative court rule.185
GR 37 might be the administrative rule that saves the peremptory
challenge from another administrative rule to kill it.186
182. For a thorough examination of the legislative history of GR 37 with
excellent sourcing to original documents and participant interviews, see Annie
Sloan, Note, What To Do About Batson?: Using a Court Rule to Address Implicit
Bias in Jury Selection, 108 CA. L. REV. 233 (2020). See id. at 246 n.88 (noting
from telephone interviews with public defenders and civil plaintiff’s lawyers that
Saintcalle was a “call of arms to protect our right to a peremptory challenge”).
183. See Justice Mary I. Yu, How Injustice and Inequality Have Been
Addressed (and Sometimes Ignored) by the Washington Supreme Court, 54 GONZ.
L. REV. 155, 163–64 (2018) (noting that “[o]ur State Supreme Court plays an
affirmative role in trying to address injustice through our administrative work,”
and “we are also actively engaged in promoting justice through the promulgation
of court rules”). See generally WASH. CT. GEN. R. 9 (detailing expansive authority
and procedures for Washington State Supreme Court rule-making).
184. See WASH. ADM’N. & PRAC. R. 28; Appendix R. 28. For a detailed review
of Washington’s adoption of the Limited License Legal Technician (LLLT)
program, see Brooks Holland, The Washington State Limited License Legal
Technician Practice Rule: A National First in Access to Justice, 82 MISS. L.J. 75
(2013). To the surprise of many access-to-justice advocates, the Washington
Supreme Court “sunset” the LLLT program on June 4, 2020. Licensed LLLTs and
LLLT candidates who are licensed by July 31, 2020, can maintain this practice
authority. But “[n]o new LLLTs will be admitted after that date.” Colin Rigley,
Limited License Legal Technician Program Under the Lens, NWSIDEBAR (June
8, 2020), https://nwsidebar.wsba.org/2020/06/01/limited-license-legal-technician
-program-under-the-lens/ [https://perma.cc/U39N-BBZ3]. The decision prompted
a vigorous dissent letter from Justice Barbara Madsen, who had been chief justice
when the LLLT was adopted and who had spoken and written about the rule
nationally. See id.
185. See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 3.1 Appendix A (2020).
186. See State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 338–39 (Wash. 2013) (noting that
“as both we and Justice González’s concurring opinion note, it might be more
appropriate to consider whether to abolish peremptory challenges through the
rule-making process instead of in the context of a specific case”).
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GR 37 as a proposal, however, did not originate in an administrative
committee of the Washington Supreme Court. Rather, the American Civil
Liberties Union of Washington initially proposed this rule as an
opportunity “to protect Washington jury trials from intentional or
unintentional, unconscious, or institutional bias in the empanelment of
juries.”187 Although this proposal championed Saintcalle’s valid concerns
over racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges, implicit in
this same proposal was the preservation of the peremptory challenge.188
The proposed solution instead was “progressive reform” of the Batson
framework for regulating these challenges.189
The twin goals of this proposal were to lower the threshold for an
improper peremptory strike from Batson’s intent-dependent test, and to
modify the Batson procedure to lessen the opportunity for lawyer
stratagem or implicit bias to thwart effective judicial review.190 The
proposal thus was framed around an “objective observer” test that would
judge the propriety of a challenged peremptory strike: “If the court
determines that an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a
factor for the peremptory challenge, the challenge shall be denied.”191 This
standard would apply to all jury trials, criminal and civil.192 Moreover, the
proposal included commentary that identified several common “raceneutral” explanations for peremptory challenges as having “historically
been used to perpetuate exclusion of minority jurors.”193 The proposal thus
established specific considerations and even presumptions that judges
would need to apply in evaluating these race-neutral explanations by
lawyers.194
In the months that followed, this proposal spurred an intensive debate
with public meetings, public comments, and counter-proposals.195
187. See ACLU’s Suggested Change to the GENERAL RULES: Rule 36 – Jury
Selection, WASH. CTS., https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules
.proposedRuleDisplay&ruleId=537 [https://perma.cc/457R-STVB] (last visited
June 5, 2020) [hereinafter ACLU Proposal]. By way of disclosure, I previously
served on the ACLU-WA’s Board of Directors, although not at the time of this
workgroup.
188. See id.
189. See Sloan, supra note 182, at 247.
190. See ACLU Proposal, supra note 187; Sloan, supra note 182, at 247–48
(noting two purposes to the proposal).
191. WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37.
192. See id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Published comments to the ACLU proposal are posted to a legacy website
from the Washington Supreme Court, available at https://www.courts.wa.gov
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Criminal defense lawyers generally supported the rule,196 as did affinity
bar groups197 and social justice organizations.198 Prosecutors, however,
uniformly opposed the rule,199 and submitted a counter-proposal that
effectively codified Batson with some modifications to voir dire
practices.200 Other feedback supported the rule in principle but quarreled
/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.commentDisplay&ruleId=537 [https://perma.cc/52
LS-G38J]. See also State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467, 477 (Wash. 2018)
(summarizing legislative history of GR 37). The proposal also received significant
unrecorded feedback at various town hall events that the sponsors hosted for
different stakeholders around Washington State. I attended several of these
events.
196. See Amy I. Muth & Leslie E. Tolzin, Proposed New General Rule 36 –
Jury Selection, WASH. ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAWS. (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www
.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2016Nov/GR36/Amy%20Muth%20and%
20Leslie%20Tolzin,%20WACDL.pdf (supporting proposal); Anita Khandelwal,
Comments on GR 36, KING CNTY. DEP’T PUB. DEF. (May 1, 2017), https://
www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2016Nov/GR36/Anita%20Khandelw
al.pdf (supporting proposal on behalf of public defense office).
197. See Chalia Stallings-Alai-ilima, Proposed New General Rule 36 – Jury
Selection, LOREN MILLER BAR ASS’N (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.courts.wa
.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2016Nov/GR36/Chalia%20Stallings-Ala-ilima.pdf
(supporting proposal); David Perez, Proposed General Rule 36, LATINO/A BAR
ASS’N WASH. (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed
/2016Nov/GR36/David%20A.%20Perez.pdf (supporting proposal); Alexandro
Kirigin, Proposed New General Rule 36 – Jury Selection, P IERCE C NTY .
M INORITY B AR A SS ’ N (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_
Rules/proposed/2016Nov/GR36/Alexandro%20Kirigin%20-%20PCMBA.pdf
(supporting proposal); Andrea Chin, Letter, ASIAN BAR ASS’N WASH. (Apr. 28,
2017), https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2016Nov/GR36/Andre
a%20Chin,%20ABAW.pdf (supporting proposal).
198. See Robert S. Chang et al., Proposed General Rule 36, KOREMATSU CTR.
L. & EQUAL. SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. L. (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.courts.wa.gov/
court_Rules/proposed/2016Nov/GR36/Korematsu%20Center%20for%20Law%
20and%20Equality.pdf (supporting proposal).
199. See Rich Weyrich, Proposed Rule GR 36, WASH. ASS’N PROSECUTING
ATT’YS (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2016
Nov/GR36/Pam%20Loginsky.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q9SK-MTMT] [hereinafter
WAPA Letter] (“The Washington Association of Prosecuting Attorneys (WAPA)
opposes the ACLU’s proposed rule”); John Juhl, Proposed Rule GR 36,
SNOHOMISH CNTY. PROSECUTING ATTY (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.courts.wa
.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2016Nov/GR36/John%20J.%20Juhl.pdf (opposing
proposal); Sloan, supra note 182, at 248 (observing that “[c]riminal prosecutors
were the primary opponents of the ACLU proposed rule”).
200. See WAPA Letter, supra note 199 (inviting the Supreme Court “to adopt
our alternative, which is a practical guide for implementing current standards on
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with details, such as the omission of protection from biases against gender,
sexual orientation, and gender identity,201 or the procedure and standards
for judicial review of challenges.202 Law students from Gonzaga
University even joined the conversation.203
In response to this multitude of perspectives, the Washington Supreme
Court commissioned a formal GR 37 Workgroup from representative
stakeholders, including civil practitioners, criminal defense lawyers,
prosecutors, other members of the legal community, administrators, and
members of the judiciary.204 The Workgroup labored for several months,

peremptory challenges”); Sloan, supra note 182, at 248–50 (describing WAPA
proposal).
201. See ACLU Proposal, supra note 187; see, e.g., Sara Ainsworth, Legal
Voice Comments Regarding Proposed Changes to GR 36-Jury Selection, LEGAL
VOICE (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/2016
Nov/GR36/Sara%20L.%20Ainsworth.pdf (supporting the proposal, but arguing
that the rule also should protect against gender discrimination, sexual orientation
discrimination, and discrimination against transgender people); cf. Sloan, supra
note 182, at 249–50 (noting the controversy over the absence of gender bias from
the initial proposal).
202. See Dominic Bacetich & Peter Meyers, GR 36 Proposal, WASH. STATE
ASS’N JUST. (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_Rules/proposed/
2016Nov/GR36/Dominic%20Bacetich%20and%20Peter%20Meyers,%20WSAJ
.pdf (questioning the absence of gender and critiquing the procedure and
standards).
203. This proposal was pending when I taught my Spring 2017 course,
Advanced Criminal Procedure: Adjudication. In this course, my students spend
significant time studying Batson jurisprudence, including the Saintcalle decision.
We accordingly took advantage of this pending proposal for students to form five
workgroups who separately analyzed and commented on the proposal. See
Interview with Students, Gonzaga University School of Law, in Spokane, Wash.
(Apr. 17, 2017). As I noted in my cover letter accompanying the student
workgroup submissions, “These comments . . . offer a small sample of the
perspectives that entering members of our profession have on this important topic
after studying the issues.” Id. These student workgroup comments are insightful,
and as one might expect, reflect a diversity of perspectives on the issue and
proposal. Id.
204. See Lila J. Silverstein et al., Proposed New GR-37—Jury Selection
Workgroup: FINAL REPORT, at 1, 15–16 (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.courts
.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20Orders/OrderNo25700-A1221Workgroup.pdf [hereinafter Workgroup Final Report] (explaining
workgroup formation and membership). For a more detailed examination of the
workgroup’s deliberations and final report, see Sloan, supra note 182, at 250–53.
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soliciting additional input from numerous other stakeholders.205 The
Workgroup Final Report captures this process206 and highlights several
points of unresolved disagreement.207 An important point of the
Workgroup consensus, however, addressed the peremptory challenge
itself: “Workgroup members discussed the idea of eliminating peremptory
challenges and concluded that they are still useful as long as they are not
based on the race or ethnicity of potential jurors.”208
The Workgroup Final Report thus submitted four major
recommendations to the Washington Supreme Court: (1) adopt the
proposed jury selection court rule to address racial discrimination in
peremptory challenges; (2) review how the rule can be expanded to include
gender and sexual orientation; (3) require education sessions for judges on
implementing the new rule, preferably prior to its effective date; and (4)
create a manual of “best practices” for jury selection under this new rule.209
The Workgroup Final Report concluded with these observations:
Collectively, members agree that a general court rule is the best
vehicle to address the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges during jury selection. The workgroup’s proposed rule
is intended to shift the burden to the striking party to prove a raceneutral basis for the challenge, instead of the current standard that
requires a judge to make sometimes subjective determinations
about the motivations of a peremptory challenge.210
In April of 2018, the Washington Supreme Court accepted the
Workgroup’s core recommendation and adopted GR 37.211 This rule is a
watershed development: it not only meaningfully regulates peremptory
challenges, but also preserves the fundamental virtues of these challenges.
205. See Workgroup Final Report, supra note 204, at 14 (submitting additional
individual and organizational statements regarding proposal).
206. See id. at 2–5.
207. See id. at 5–6. Major points of disagreement included whether to add
gender and sexual orientation to the rule, whether to mandate increased time for
voir dire, whether the objective standard for sustaining an objection under the rule
should be “could view” or “would view” race as a factor, and whether the rule
should codify race-neutral reason for strikes that should be treated with caution or
even presumptively invalid. See id.
208. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
209. See id. at 7–8.
210. Id. at 8.
211. See WASH. CT. GEN. R. 37. GR 37 is available at https://www.courts.
wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.display&group=ga&set=GR&ruleid=gagr37
[https://perma.cc/WJ2F-MVV6] (listing effective date of April 24, 2018).
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The rule applies to all jury trials212 and is meant “to eliminate the unfair
exclusion of potential jurors on race or ethnicity.”213 The rule further
authorizes any party, or the court on its own motion, to object to a
peremptory challenge as improper under the rule.214 These features of GR
37 smack of basic Batson jurisprudence. The major reforms to Batson
codified in GR 37, however, include the following:
1. The rule eliminates Batson’s clunky three-stage, prima facie
test once a party objects to a challenge. Instead, upon
objection, “the party exercising the peremptory challenge
shall articulate the reasons that the peremptory challenge has
been exercised.”215
2. In evaluating the objection and response, the trial judge no
longer evaluates whether the striking party engaged in
purposeful discrimination sufficient for an equal protection
violation. Rather, the trial judge examines the totality of
circumstances to determine whether “an objective observer
could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the
peremptory challenge.”216 The “objective observer,”
moreover, is defined as an “observer [who] is aware that
implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases, in addition to
purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair
exclusion of potential jurors in Washington State.”217
3. The rule invites judges to consider a range of evidence in
assessing whether race could be a factor in the challenged
strike, including traditional comparative evidence.218 The rule,
however, expressly defines certain race-neutral explanations as
“presumptively” invalid, because they “have been associated
with improper discrimination in jury selection in Washington
State.”219 Moreover, associating several other common
justifications for strikes with improper discrimination, the rule
212. See id. R. 37(b).
213. Id. R. 37(a).
214. See id. R. 37(c).
215. Id. R. 37(d).
216. Id. R. 37(e) (emphases added).
217. Id. R. 37(f).
218. See id. R. 37(g).
219. Id. R. 37(h). These reasons include, for example, prior contact with law
enforcement, district of law enforcement or a belief that the police engage in racial
profiling, a close relationship with persons who have been arrested or convicted,
residence in a high-crime neighborhood, and not being a native English speaker.
See id.
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requires the party offering that justification to give notice so the
court and opposing party can verify that information.220 The
judge or opposing lawyer’s inability to verify this basis for the
strike “shall invalidate the reason given for the peremptory
challenge.”221
GR 37 thus uniquely invites judges to critically examine peremptory
challenges for implicit bias as well as explicit bias. In this assessment, the
judge will consider the history of racial bias, individually and structurally,
in the system of jury selection. Further, the rule does not excuse biased
strikes that may co-exist with mixed motives not relating to race.222 Also,
the objecting lawyer no longer must effectively accuse opposing counsel
of intentional racial discrimination. Rather, the responding lawyer must be
persuasive based on the evidentiary record in defending the peremptory
strike against the claim of objective bias. Resort to tired cliché or
unsupported rationales will result in the juror being reseated. These
reforms thus open a rich, new, objective field for judicial review of
peremptory challenges that may limit their vices. Yet, these reforms also
still draw on the adversarial process and lawyer advocacy to challenge and
defend these independent strikes from parties as the primary process for
achieving an impartial jury.
GR 37, however, does exclude some important details. First, the rule
is limited to racial bias in the use of peremptory strikes. Claims of bias
implicating gender, sexual orientation, or other protected classifications
presumably still will be decided under the traditional Batson test. Trial
judges thus may have to shuffle between two different tests during jury
selection—GR 37 for race and Batson for everything else. This analysis
could be especially complicated when challenges to individual jurors
involve claims of intersectional bias, implicating, for instance, race and
gender.223 Perhaps the Washington Supreme Court will revisit this
exclusion, which the Workgroup Final Report recommended.224
220. Id. R. 37(i). These factors include many of the common body language
and demeanor explanations for peremptory challenges that have been upheld
under Batson, such as inattentiveness, non-responsive answers, failure to make
eye contact, and facial expressions. See id.
221. Id.
222. Contra Kesser v. Cambra, 465 F.3d 351, 373–75 (9th Cir. 2006)
(upholding mixed-motive analysis under Batson, and noting that “[e]very one of
our sister circuits to have decided Batson cases in which mixed motives are
present has come to this conclusion”).
223. Cf. Wright, Chavis & Parks, supra note 28, at 1427 (observing
complexity of jury section patterns “[w]hen race and gender intersected”)
224. See Workgroup Final Report, supra note 204, at 7.
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Second, GR 37 establishes no remedy for erroneous applications of
the rule by trial judges. The rule does not even identify an appellate
standard of review for these decisions. As an administrative rule, GR 37
does not draw naturally on pre-existing constitutional standards. The
Washington Supreme Court, however, decided to leave these questions for
another day. Nevertheless, lawyers, trial judges, and especially
intermediate appellate courts need this insight in short order as practice
develops around GR 37.
The Washington Supreme Court provided critical insight into GR 37
in State v. Jefferson.225 This case presented a Batson claim, yet GR 37 was
adopted after Jefferson’s jury trial.226 The court, therefore, concluded that
it could not apply GR 37 retroactively to Jefferson’s jury selection.227 The
court, however, reaffirmed that “Batson has failed to eliminate race
discrimination in jury selection.”228 The court consequently decided that
the Batson test “must be modified in order to prevent discrimination in
jury selection.”229 The court thus substituted GR 37’s “objective observer”
standard for stage three of Batson’s analysis, the purposeful discrimination
prong.230 This inquiry includes GR 37’s definition of the objective
observer as “a person who is aware of the history of explicit race
discrimination in America and aware of how that impacts our current
decision making in nonexplicit, or implicit, unstated, ways.”231 The court
further announced that the standard of appellate review on this “objective
observer” question is not deferential at all, but rather de novo.232 In the
end, this importation of GR 37 into Batson sent a potentially strong
message, because the court concluded Jefferson failed to establish a

225. State v. Jefferson, 429 P.3d 467 (Wash. 2018).
226. Id. at 470–74.
227. See id. at 477–78.
228. Id. at 477.
229. See id. at 479.
230. See id. at 480. The precise legal stature of GR 37 is not entirely clear
following Jefferson. GR 37 is an administrative rule, not a constitutional rule.
Jefferson incorporates key parts of GR 37 into Washington’s constitutional
Batson test. In dissent, Justice Barbara Madsen claimed the majority effectively
constitutionalized GR 37. See id. at 482, 483 (“[T]he lead opinion essentially
adopts GR 37 into our Batson framework . . . . Indeed, GR 37 was never meant to
be a constitutional rule backed by constitutional protections. . . . [T]he lead
opinion creates a new constitutional rule in place of the third [Batson] element.”).
231. Id. at 480.
232. See id. (noting that “we stand in the same position as does the trial court,
and we review the record and the trial court’s conclusions on this third Batson
step de novo”).
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traditional Batson violation, but did establish a GR 37 violation.233 The
resulting message to lawyers and trial judges: GR 37 means business.
This combination of GR 37 and Jefferson thus positioned Washington
as an exciting incubator for Batson reform while preserving the
peremptory challenge.234 Other state courts and advocates outside of
Washington have noticed and are exploring the potential for similar
reform, drawing on Washington’s model.235 The path forward, however,
will be extremely important for determining whether GR 37 truly
empowers the law to confront the bias dichotomy in jury selection or
simply serves as a symbolic but ineffectual iteration of the Batson
regime.236 To maximize the opportunity for GR 37 to meet its goals, some
forward-looking considerations are important.
CONCLUSION: LOOKING FORWARD
GR 37 preserves the peremptory challenge but creates almost a soft,
reverse challenge for cause if an opposing party or a trial judge is
concerned that the peremptory strike implicates racial bias. GR 37 thus
arms the parties and the trial judge with much more effective means for
policing racial discrimination in peremptory challenges, in all its forms,
explicit and implicit, while still permitting the parties to have a direct voice
in the jury’s impartiality. So long as the challenge is not objectively based
on race, the State’s permission is not needed to exercise it.
233. See id. at 481.
234. Cf. Sloan, supra note 182, at 263 (“I believe that GR 37 successfully
departs from Batson’s failings and still maintains the spirit of peremptory
challenges.”).
235. See State v. Holmes, 221 A.3d 407, 435 (Conn. 2019) (referring to GR
37 and referring “systemic considerations” to a jury selection task force); see also
State v. Veal, 930 N.W.2d 319, 341 (Iowa 2019) (Appel, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); People v. Bryant, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 289, 310 (Ct. App. 2019)
(Humes, P.J., concurring). The Berkeley Law Death Penalty Clinic recently issued
an extensive report on the history of racial discrimination by prosecutors in using
peremptory challenges. See ELISABETH SEMEL ET AL., WHITEWASHING THE JURY
BOX: HOW CALIFORNIA PERPETUATES THE DISCRIMINATORY EXCLUSION OF
BLACK AND LATINX JURORS (June 2020), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/06/Whitewashing-the-Jury-Box.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KT
S-58EG]. In recommending reform rather than advocating for the wholesale
elimination of the peremptory challenge, the authors call for new peremptory
challenge regulation that draws expressly on the model that GR 37 established.
See id. at iv–xi.
236. Cf. Sloan, supra note 182, at 255 (commenting that “GR 37 is inadequate
if it is merely symbolic and in effect repeats Batson”).
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The significant reforms that GR 37 may accomplish could extend to
voir dire itself, without the need for a new court rule. For lawyers and
judges to anticipate, argue, and evaluate GR 37 claims, they will need to
approach jury selection thoughtfully and sensitively, building an evidencebased, credible record for why lawyers struck jurors for party-centric
concerns over impartiality that are rooted in more than just hunch and
intuition.237 Jefferson’s standard of de novo review may reinforce the need
for judges to permit and even encourage this engaged approach to voir dire
across both challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.238
An engaged, evidence-based approach to voir dire and GR 37
determinations will not succeed, however, without training, training, and
more training.239 These programs should extend at a minimum to training
in implicit bias, training in effective voir dire techniques, training in how
to argue and analyze GR 37 claims, and even cultural training within
courthouses and law offices.240 This kind of training, importantly, is still
client-centric for zealous advocates, because it helps lawyers more

237. Cf. State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 364 (Wash. 2013) (González, J.,
concurring) (critiquing non-evidentiary foundations for some peremptory
challenges).
238. Cf. Anna Offit, Race-Conscious Jury Selection, 82 OHIO ST. L.J.,
(forthcoming 2021), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=3587892) [https://perma.cc/MYQ2-HD7M] (rough draft, page 183)
(noting that under GR 37 “[t]o an increasing extent, judges will need to be
watchful of their own rationales for excusing jurors during the ‘cause challenge’
phase of jury selection proceedings. . . . The result will be more juries composed
of individuals whose life experiences reflects that of the broader and diverse
public”).
239. Cf. Workgroup Final Report, supra note 204, at 7–8 (advocating for
judicial education and lawyer best practices training under GR 37).
240. Cf. Richardson & Goff, supra note 67, at 2641–48 (detailing training and
best practices recommendations to minimize implicit bias in public defender
practices); Adam Benforado & John Hanson, The Great Attributional Divide:
How Divergent Views of Human Behavior Are Shaping Legal Policy, 57 EMORY
L.J. 311, 325–26 (2007) (research supporting proposition that self-awareness and
mindfulness about implicit biases can help actors to make fairer decisions). For a
specific proposal, see Richard Gabriel, Understanding Bias: Preserving
Peremptory Challenges, Preventing Their Discriminatory Use, and Providing
Fairer and More Impartial Juries, CIV. JURY PROJECT, https://civiljuryproject.
law.nyu.edu/understanding-bias-preserving-peremptory-challenges-preventingtheir-discriminatory-use-and-providing-fairer-and-more-impartial-juries/ [https://
perma.cc/9LBY-27XJ] (last visited June 9, 2020) (making five recommendations
on training and practices to reduce discrimination and enhance value with
peremptory challenges).
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accurately identify real, evidence-based concerns for juror bias. Untrained
shots in the dark, by contrast, less often advance the client’s cause.241
This training could even extend to the jurors themselves. For instance,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
shows prospective jurors an educational video on implicit bias that jurors
will bring with them into the voir dire process.242 Western District judges
also give jurors a number of legal instructions on implicit bias, including,
when requested, instructions prior to voir dire.243 If the goal of GR 37 is
to reduce the influence of invidious biases in jury selection, including
implicit biases, then engaging the jury itself on this issue might further that
goal. With all of these practices under GR 37, lawyers may achieve far
more good than when they solely “rely on intuition, lore, and anecdotal
experience in exercising peremptory challenges.”244
Scholars also should measure GR 37 with reliable, extensive research
to see whether it is achieving reduced racial bias, increased jury diversity
and independence, and effective use of the peremptory challenge by
advocates. Some of this research has started already. For instance, a
student researcher has gathered interview data from lawyers in
Washington about the early impact of GR 37.245 Initial observations
included that “lawyers have become hesitant to strike jurors of color,”246
and “an increase in objections to peremptory challenges.”247 One
Washington public defender reported to this student that, post-GR 37,
“‘prosecutors are not striking anyone who is visibly of color.’”248
Another scholar has considered GR 37 in the context of a five-year
field study of jury selection practices by Assistant United States
Attorneys.249 This scholar observed that “GR 37 is likely to impact
prosecutors’ behavior . . . in unpredictable ways.”250 The author explained
to illustrate this point:

241. Holland, supra note 7, at 144–45 (citing value of lawyer bias training to
advocacy and client interests in the context of Model Rule 8.4(g)).
242. See Unconscious Bias Juror Video, supra note 9.
243. See Criminal Jury Instruction—Unconscious Bias, supra note 9.
244. State v. Saintcalle, 309 P.3d 326, 364 (Wash. 2013) (González, J.,
concurring).
245. See Sloan, supra note 182, at 255 (noting interviews of 21 people within
six months of the rule’s enactment, including civil attorneys, criminal attorneys,
two trial judges, one appellate judge, and a court administrator).
246. Id. at 255, 257.
247. Id. at 255.
248. Id. at 257.
249. See Offit, supra note 238.
250. Id. at 181.
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Prosecutors who view the rarity of successful Batson challenges
as reason to question their relevance may find reason to more
meaningfully alter their behavior if an effect of GR 37 is to make
challenges more prevalent and easily won. This development
might amplify Batson’s deterrent potential by bringing the stakes
of violations into view.251
At the same time, the rule’s “reference to ‘implicit, unconscious, and
institutional’ bias may nevertheless undercut Batson’s deterrent effect on
those lawyers primarily concerned with the professional and reputational
harm of a Batson challenge.”252
A more extensive record than a few months of experience under GR
37 will be necessary for meaningful conclusions.253 A particularly
important long-term research agenda could be comparative in nature,
measuring differences in practices and outcomes between Washington and
jurisdictions that maintain the Batson regime, plus any jurisdictions that
may decide to eliminate or significantly reduce peremptory challenges. If
more jurisdictions adopt iterations of Washington’s GR 37, this
comparative research could become even more robust and illuminating.
Research centers like the Jury Sunshine Project are already demonstrating
rich expertise at examining jury selection patterns.254
This research could shed determinative light on whether new models
like GR 37 can effectively confront the intractable bias dichotomy in jury
selection. With such a viable option to address invidious bias in jury
selection, however, one should be cautious about jumping precipitously to
one-sided solutions like elimination of the peremptory challenge. Instead,
the legal community should work on extending the hopeful success of GR
37 to other types of bias, such as gender and sexual orientation bias, within
an adversarial jury selection process. Within this framework, perhaps the
law better can fulfill the imperative of eliminating racism and other
invidious biases on both sides of the bias dichotomy—lawyer and juror.

251. Id. at 182.
252. Id.
253. Cf. Sloan, supra note 182, at 259–61 (proposing a four-part research
agenda).
254. See JURY SUNSHINE PROJECT, http://news.law.wfu.edu/tag/jury-sun
shine-project/ [https://perma.cc/68ZW-3P4W] (last visited June 1, 2020).

